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SUMMARY
It has long been recognised by the Auditing Profession that 
an examination of the accounting system and its internal 
controls allows the auditor, provided the results of the 
systems examination are favourable, to reduce the extent 
of the detailed substantive testing. Such an approach is 
conventionally called a 'systems* approach to the audit. It 
is also recognised that the auditor does not have to place 
reliance on internal control if he does not judge such an 
approach to be cost effective. In this case the auditor 
maintains the level of substantive testing and the approach 
is termed a * substantive* approach.
In this thesis it is argued that the generally recognised 
role of the systems examination in allowing a reduction of 
substantive testing is only one of three important audit 
roles which the systems examination may play in support of 
the substantive testing. The other two less well recognised 
roles are;
a) as a source of information to help the auditor select
Sf'Q Wsfrtcal
a/sampling technique for the substantive testing, and
b) as a source of information to help the auditor assess 
pieces of evidence used in the substantive testing 
where the evidence has been processed or generated 
by the system.
The main body of the thesis consists of a detailed study of 
each of the three roles.
In the Conclusion it is argued that a recognition of three, 
rather than one, roles for the systems examination allows 
a greater understanding of the true distinction between what 
are conventionally described as the "systems' and "substantive" 
approaches to the audit. Further research is recommended 
both to substantiate the tentative "a priori"reasoning of 
the conclusion and to provide empirical evidence of the ex­
tent to which there is a lack of understanding on the part 
of practising auditors of the three aspects of the relation­
ship between the systems and substantive evidence.
INTRODUCTION
The auditor must obtain evidence to the extent necessary 
to provide, inter alia, sufficient assurance as to the 
completeness, accuracy and validity of the accounting 
records. For this purpose the principal sources of 
audit evidence are evaluation/compliance tests of 
internal controls and substantive tests. In general, 
the auditor's selected mix of evidence from internal 
controls and substantive testing will be such as to 
give the most efficient use of audit resources to 
achieve the level of assurance required. ( 1)
This statement usefully serves as the starting point for the 
thesis which investigates the relationships that exist be­
tween the systems and substantive evidence as employed by the 
external auditor. The thesis assumes that the auditor wishes 
to establish the credibility of the underlying figures in 
accounts and that the principal means to such audit verifi­
cation are an examination of the accounting system and its 
internal controls on the one hand, and substantive testing on 
the other, and it sets out to promote better understanding of 
the variety of important roles which the systems work plays 
in support of the substantive testing.
The basic arguments of this thesis are expounded in the final 
section of this introductory chapter. However, first it is 
desirable to place the issue tackled in the thesis in the wider 
context of auditing issues, problems and relationships. It is 
necessary to recognise the following:
1, The "accountability relationship" considered (i.e. that 
between the directors and shareholders of a limited 
company) is just one of many such relationships, financial 
or otherwise, which exist in society.
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2* The audit opinions considered (i.e. as to whether the 
balance sheet gives a true and fair view of the state 
of affairs and profit or loss account a true and fair
view of profit or loss) are just two of five audit
opinions required of a limited company's auditor#
5# Establishing the credibility of the underlying figures 
in the accounts is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
prerequisite of forming the true and fair view opinions# 
Other prerequisites are not considered in the thesis.
4# The two sources of audit evidence considered (systems
and substantive) are two out of several sources used by
the auditor to establish the credibility of accounting
figures* The thesis does not consider the interrelation­
ships between other combinations of audit evidence#
At first sight these four factors may appear to seriously 
limit the relevance of the problem discussed in the thesis#
In fact this is not so for the following reasons;
1. A great many audits performed in the United Kingdom are 
limited company audits ;
2. for limited company audits, the majority of audit time
relates to the true and fair view rather than other audit
opinions;
5# for the true and fair view opinions, much of the audit
time is concerned to establish the credibility of the 
underlying figures, and,
4# when establishing the credibility of the figures, the
majority of audit time is concerned with systems and
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substantive evidence, rather than other sources of 
evidence.
Thus, a significant amount of audit resources are affected 
by the issues discussed in the thesis. The author knows 
from his contacts with practising auditors that the issue 
is regarded by them as being significant.
IDENTIFYING THE ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONSHIP 
V/henever one party in society is accountable for his actions 
to a second party, there exists an "accountability relation­
ship", Should this accountability relationship be essentially 
a financial one, the performance of the accountability function 
requires the measurement, generally in money terms, of the 
financial events conducted. If this measurement is performed 
or controlled by the accountable party himself, then account­
ability requires communication of the measurements (in the 
form of financial statements) to the second party. In these 
circumstances, accountability is considerably improved through 
the performance of an examination of the financial statements 
by an expert person independent of the accountable party, pro­
vided the results of this examination are communicated along 
with the financial statement results. This examination or 
* audit* is designed to add credibility to the financial 
statements prepared by the accountable party.
As far as this thesis is concerned, the only accountability 
relationship considered is that between the directors of a 
limited company, incorporated under the Companies Acts, and 
the shareholders. It does not concern accountability relation­
ships which exist between various groups involved with
organisations other than limited companies, or accountability 
relationships between the directors of a limited company and 
groups other than its shareholders. The thesis is, there­
fore, only directly relevant to auditing problems associated 
with one particular, albeit important, accountability re­
lationship drawn from a much larger population* Although 
the issues discussed in this thesis may be relevant to 
auditing problems associated with other accountability 
relationships, no attempt is made to explore this question,
IDENTIFYING THE AUDIT OPINION
Under the 19^7 Companies Act, the auditor of a limited company 
is required to form an opinion on the following matters;
1, Whether the balance sheet shows a true and fair view of 
the company's affairs at the balance sheet date.
2. Whether the profit and loss account shows a true and fair
view of the company's profit or loss for the financial
year.
5. Whether the accounts comply with the Companies Acts 1948 
and 1967.
4. V/hether proper accounting records have been kept.
5. Whether the company's balance sheet and profit and loss
account are in agreement with the accounting records.
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This thesis limits itself to consideration of the audit work 
whidph is necessary to form the first two of these five opinions 
(i.e. the 'true and fair view* opinions). The audit work which 
is necessary in order to form the true and fair view opinions 
will certainly involve consideration of the Companies Acts 1948 
and 1967, the propriety of the accounting records and agreement 
between financial statements and accounting records. However, 
there may be additional audit work which is necessary in order 
to form any of the last three opinions but which is not neces­
sarily required for the true and fair view opinions. It is 
considered that the question of the most efficient approach 
to the overall statutory audit of a limited company should be 
tackled in two stages:
1. V/hat is the most efficient approach in order to form 
the 'true and fair view* opinions alone?
2. To what extent is it necessary to reconsider the approach 
identified in 1, above as a consequence of the require­
ments of the other three audit opinions?
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Although there is an interconnection between the two, this 
thesis does not explicitly answer the second of these two 
questions, and the matter is left as a subject for further 
study*
Thus, the thesis is only concerned with auditing problems 
directly relevant to the formation of two audit opinions from 
a total population of five required by the 19^7 Companies Act* 
For the most part, it is these true and fair view opinions 
which generate the majority of the audit work* However, there 
are occasions when the auditor is unable to form any true and 
fair view opinion as a result of uncertainty caused by a lack 
of suitable audit evidence. In such circumstances the auditor 
is unable to state whether or not, in his opinion, the accounts 
show a true and fair view, but he may be able to state that 
proper accounting records have not been kept. The thrust of 
the audit work is deflected from the true and fair view opinions 
to the opinion as to proper accounting records. The Companies 
Act 1967 states that accounting records shall be such as to 
enable the directors to ensure that any balance sheet or profit 
and loss account prepared by them give a true and fair view of 
the company's profit or loss. In circumstances where the 
auditor cannot ascertain whether the balance sheet or profit 
and loss account give a true and fair view, there must be a 
strong likelihood that the directors are not able to ensure 
that they do, and proper accounting records are not being kept.
This thesis is concerned with the audit of enterprises which 
have both an accounting system including internal controls
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(systems evidence) and substantive evidence available to 
support the financial statements. In these circumstances 
there is most unlikely to be uncertainty caused by a shortage 
of audit evidence. This thesis does not consider the impli­
cations for the audit of adequate audit evidence being 
unobtainable.
AN OVERVIW OF THE AUDIT PROOESS
The auditor's opinion as to the true and fair view of the 
state of affairs and profit and loss for the year relates to 
the accounts as a whole and not to the individual items in the 
accounts. However, the forming of an opinion on the accounts 
as a whole must be preceded by the forming of an opinion as to 
the credibility of the figures in the accounts. This thesis 
is concerned with the audit work necessary to establish credi­
bility in the underlying figures of the accounts. It is not 
concerned with other audit work which is also necessary before 
forming an opinion on the accounts as a whole.
Section 14(l) of the 1967 Companies Act specifies that the 
responsibility for the accounts of a company rests with the 
directors whilst the auditor's responsibility is to report on 
thoseaccounts. There is unlikely to be a 'standard' audit 
approach in circumstances where the directors are considered 
by the auditor to be unreliable or untrustworthy. However, in 
circumstances where directors make a serious attempt to discharge 
their responsibility for the accounts, the audit approaches taken 
by the major auditing firms in order to establish the credi­
bility of the underlying figures in the accounts are well 
documented in their audit manuals. Figure 1 (The Audit Process)
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represents a typical approach. The audit process may be 
thought of as a logical ordering of the various categories 
of audit evidence which the auditor uses to establish credi­
bility in accounting figures. This thesis is concerned with 
the relationship between two stages in the audit process 
(systems examination and detailed substantive tests) and is 
not concerned to study other interrelationships.
Audit Objectives
Detailed audit objectives are developed from the auditor's 
reporting requirements, which for limited companies are 
specified in the I967 Companies Acts, and from relevant decided 
cases. Satisfactory completion of these objectives is a neces­
sary but not, in view of the auditor's responsibility to give 
an opinion on the accounts as a whole, a sufficient condition 
for an unqualified audit report. Detailed audit objectives 
concerned with the correct accounting treatment of a trans­
action or balance include validity, authority, completeness, 
valuation, classification and disclosure (for transactions) and 
existence, ownership, completeness, valuation, classification 
and disclosure (for balances). (2), However, the development 
of a complete set of detailed audit objectives is itself a 
major topic and outside the scope of this thesis. This thesis 
assumes that an agreed set of detailed audit objectives is in 
existence and considers,for the subset of objectives concerned 
with the credibility of accounting figures, alternative 
approaches to attainment.
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GA 67 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND DECIDED CASES
 ^DETAILED AUDIT OBJECTIVES 
KNOWLEDGE OP BUSINESS 
^ ^ POPULATION STATISTICS
"^^INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ACCOUNTING FIGURES 
^ ^ SYSTEMS EXAMINATION
DETAILED SUBSTANTIVE TESTS 
1 AUDIT OPINION ON CREDIBILITY OF FIGURES
FIGURE i : THE AUDIT PROCESS
Knowledge of the Business
Knowledge of the business includes an understanding of the 
operations of the business and of the financial and economic 
circumstances in which those operations are conducted. A set 
of accounts do not show and true and fair view if they do not 
reflect the operations of the business, and hence such knowledge 
is essential. , Knowledge of operations is also a first step to­
ward an understanding of accounting population statistics, and 
interrelationships between accounting totals, the types of 
systems which should be in operation and the type of substantive 
testing which may be feasible.
Knowledge of the business includes an understanding of the 
attitudes, motives and character of company management. As 
previously stated, an assumption underlying the audit process 
outlined in figure 1 is that management is both able and willing 
to discharge its responsibility to produce proper accounts. A
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weak management may not be able to insist on the installation 
of appropriate controls, whereas a strong but unscrupulous 
management may override controls and otherwise interfere with 
audit evidence. It is essential that the auditor carefully 
examines and considers the character of management and the 
pressures under which they are operating. ( 3)
The major source of knowledge of the business is experience 
gained on prior audits. When an audit is undertaken for the 
first time it follows that the auditor should make a special 
attempt to acquire such knowledge. Indeed he probably should 
do so before accepting the appointment as auditor. Such 
knowledge may be acquired by the following means:
a) a study of the previous auditor's files
b) plant visits and tours
c) discussion with company management
d) industry and client publications, including financial 
statements.
Population Statistics
The preparation and study of population statistics is a vital 
part of the audit process, for the following reasons:
1. It may indicate circumstances where systems examination 
is uneconomic. Should a small number of items comprise 
either the entire accounting population or a very large 
per cent by value, a study of the accounting system may 
prove uneconomic and the auditor will concentrate on the 
substantive testing. Generally speaking the inter­
relationships between the
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systems examination and substantive testing studied in 
this thesis, are only appropriate where a significant 
per cent by value of an accounting population is made 
up of a large number of items.
2. It may indicate circumstances where certain statistical 
sampling techniques are inappropriate or where substantive 
testing on a sample basis at all is inappropriate.
The accuracy and efficiency of variables sampling tech­
niques can depend upon certain population statistics.
For example, mean per unit sampling is inaccurate for 
skewed populations and inefficient for highly variable 
populations. Should an accounting population consist of 
a small number of items it may be decided that any 
sampling plan is inappropriate and the auditor will test 
items forming the population on a 100% basis.
3. It may, when combined with a knowledge of business 
operations, reveal elementary but fundamental errors.
For example, a breakdown of the accounting population 
between major components of the business may reveal a 
component which has been omitted.
Inter-relationshius between Accounting Figures 
The relationship between figures in the accounts may be 
expected, unexpected or known. Where the relationship is 
in accordance with expectations the auditor may reduce his 
detailed study of the figures, but where the relationship is 
unexpected he may increase his detailed study. The auditor 
may base his expectations upon -
a) a study of the same relationship in past years
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b) a study of the same relationship for other firms in the 
same business*
c) Knowledge of recent operations, ,and the financial and 
economic circumstances in which they are conducted.
Perhaps the most commonly used example of a known relationship 
is that created through the use of the double entry matrix (4 )< 
Thus it is possible to test for overstatement of sales by 
testing for overstatement of debtors, and similarly it is 
possible to test for understatement of debtors by testing 
for understatèment of sales.
The AICPA ( 5 ) suggest two categories of substantive test;
(a) tests of details of transactions and balances and (b) 
analytical review of significant ratios and trends. The 
latter forms a part of the 'interrelationship between account­
ing figures' shown in figure 1 , and in figure 1 , the former
is entitled 'detailed substantive tests'.
Systems Examination
The installation of suitable internal control procedures is 
one means by which management satisfy themselves that proper 
accounts are being prepared. Internal control, therefore, is 
introduced in the first instance by management to discharge a 
management responsibility and it may then be used by the 
auditor as a source of audit evidence. Internal controls 
primarily cover the<authorisation and recording of trans­
actions, although centrolo ever--bal-anoe pheot items (e.g.
phye-icaX—stocktake procedures  ^ bank reconeiliations,- ageing
■and review of debtors etc) -may- alsO' be important-.- In addition, 
through the interrelationship of accounts, an examination of 
internal
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control over transactions may play a supportive role in the 
audit of balance sheet items.
The audit opinions required under the Companies Acts have been 
previously stated and none of the five opinions directly re­
lates to internal control, but internal control does indirectly 
provide evidence for the true and fair view opinions and the 
opinion relating to proper accounting records. Hence, the 
auditor of a limited company incorporated under the Companies 
Acts uses his opinion of internal control as indirect evidence 
in support of the accounts and accounting records, and although 
he may make comments on internal control to management, this 
is not a primary function of the audit, since it is not re­
quired by the Companies Acts. The discussion in this thesis 
assumes that an opinion on internal control is not a primary 
function of the audit and the discussion is not necessarily 
relevant to audits where this assumption does not hold.
Internal control is indirect evidence and it is also subjective 
evidence. There are at the present time no generally accepted 
standards for the evaluation of a system of internal control. 
Experts can generally agree on the strengths and weaknesses 
but they tend to disagree on their relative importance. Even 
if an ideal system could be developed, its operation would 
still depend upon the people concerned. Any evaluation of 
internal control requires an evaluation of the people operating 
the system and this is inevitably a subjective area. As an 
illustration of this problem consider the nearest possible 
situation to a perfect system. Suppose a system not only
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includes many internal checks, reconciliations and divisions 
of duties but also incorporates an internal audit department 
which performs all the detailed audit work otherwise conducted 
by the external auditor. Moreover, the internal audit depart­
ment produce excellent reports of work performed and conclusions 
reached and the department has a high level of independence.
(For example, the client may be the UK subsidiary of a US 
corporation and the internal audit department is a part 
of corporate headquarters staff). In these circumstances 
would the external auditor be entitled to place reliance on 
the reports of the internal auditor without reperforming any 
of the internal auditor's work? The answer is that, for 
material areas of the audit, he would probably not be so 
entitled. Even if the external auditor held the internal 
auditor in the highest possible regard, the users of accounts 
are likely to expect a measure of reperformance by the external 
auditor and may regard any external auditor who does not do 
so, as being negligent. There is at least some recent case 
law to support this view. In the Continental Vending case 
(us 1962) it was stated by the judge that 'an auditor should 
not rely on the mere representations of a client if he can 
check them himself, and in the Pacific Acceptance case 
(Australia 1970) it was stated that 'an auditor may properly 
rely a great deal on enquiries made and explanations sought 
of the company's staff and management at the appropriate level, 
but prima facie this is in aid of his vouching and checking 
procedures and not in substitution for them'•
14
jpho oonolusion is, therefore, that Systems evidence will
always need to be supported by substantive testing either
because of the inherent limitations of systems evidence and/
or because the users of accounts have an expectation that
substantive tests will be performed. (Reperformance by the
external auditor of work done by client's staff is regarded
by this author as being a substantive test).
In spite of these disadvantages, much auditing literature
has suggested that emphasis be given to internal control at
the expense of detailed substantive testing. Although the
English Institute through the Auditor's Operational Standard (6)
now recognise that an auditor may choose not to rely upon
internal control if the substantive approach is judged more
efficient, the English Institute's 'Statement on Auditing*
No. IJl which was superseded by the Auditing Standards stated;
The auditors should aim to reduce their detailed 
checking to the minimum consistent with the 
system of internal control ... Auditors should 
therefore direct their attention in the first 
instance to the system of internal control. (7)
The AICPA's second standard of fieldwork states:
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of 
existing internal control as a basis for reliance 
thereon and for the determination of the resultant 
extent of the tests to which auditing procedures 
are to be restricted, ( 8)
Both these statements suggest the auditor should adopt what
is known as the 'systems approach* to auditing. They reveal
two interrelated but distinct aspects of that approach -
emphasis and timing.
Firstly the auditor, as far as possible, reduces his detailed
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checking and restricts his auditing procedures to that level 
consistent with or determined by the system of internal con­
trol. The systems approach requires the auditor, as far as 
the system of internal control allows, to maximise his re­
liance on the examination of internal control. The emphasis 
is on the system of internal control. However, given its 
subjective nature, it is inadvisable to rely exclusively on 
internal control which should be supported by substantive 
testing.
Following the systems approach the auditor examines internal 
control in the first instance and as a basis for determination 
of further tests. The timing is that an examination of in­
ternal control precedes output tests. Given the systems 
approach the auditor is directed, on the basis of his exami­
nation of the system to those areas where the system is weak 
and, hence, the likelihood of error is greatest, and such an 
approach requires the systems examination to precede substan­
tive output tests.
The distinguishing features of the systems approach may, there­
fore, be summarised as follows:
1. It gives emphasis to the system of internal control as 
a source of audit evidence.
2. Given the nature of internal control, it is not possible 
to rely exclusively on internal control, which must, 
therefore, be supported by substantive testing.
5. The extent of substantive testing is limited to that
considered necessary for the system of internal control.
4. Since the system provides the key to the substantive
testing, it is the systems examination which must be 
performed first.
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Detailed Substantive Tests
Detailed substantive tests directly examine items making up 
the accounting figures on which the auditor must form an 
opinion, and can be tests of either transactions forming a 
profit or loss figure or balances forming a balance sheet 
figure. They provide direct audit evidence and they are also 
comparatively objective, especially when the sample is chosen 
at random and statistical techniques are used to provide a 
measure of the level of uncertainty which results through 
sampling (sampling error).
However, even if a 100% sample were taken, uncertainty would 
still exist due to the fact that the bona fides of indivi­
dual transactions can never be established with certitude 
(non sampling error). The auditor must attempt to control 
sampling error through selection of appropriate statistical 
techniques and sample sizes, and he must control non sampling 
error through the selection of appropriate audit evidence in 
support of individual transactions. Both selections are 
likely to require knowledge of the system of internal account­
ing control, and the acquisition of this knowledge must precede 
the performance of the substantive tests.
There is a particular problem in relying on substantive testing 
alone for audit assurance as to the completeness of accounting 
records. As far as the completeness objective is concerned it 
is necessary for substantive testing to be supported by evalu­
ation and compliance testing of internal controls relevant to 
the completeness objective. For example, substantive testing
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of despatches to sales invoices is not capable of providing 
sufficient assurance as to the completeness of sales without 
a detailed evaluation and compliance testing of controls 
designed to ensure that no goods are despatched without a 
despatch note being raised. On the question of completeness, 
analytical review techniques have an especially important part 
to play, and since the relationships of analytical review with 
systems evidence and detailed substantive tests are outside 
the scope of the thesis, the discussion in the thesis is of 
lesser relevance to the completeness objective than to other 
detailed objectives.
Just as there are those who advocate a systems approach, which 
gives emphasis to a study of the system and its internal con­
trols, there are those who advocate a quite different substan­
tive approach, giving emphasis to detailed substantive tests.
In order to obtain background knowledge of the audit approaches 
adopted by UK auditing firms the author held discussions with 
twelve of the largest auditing firms in the UK, In each case 
discussion was with a partner or manager from the technical 
department of the firm concerned. No attempt was made to con­
duct a formal survey, but several of the major auditing firms 
stated in those discussions that they considered their approach 
to be 'substantive*.
Compared to the systems approach, the substantive approach has 
been less clearly identified and defined in official pronounce­
ments and the auditing literature. In general, it may be 
applied to describe all audit strategies where the emphasis
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is given to the substantive testing of output rather than to 
the system of internal control which generated that output.
The distinguishing features of the substantive approach may
be summarised as follows:
1. It gives emphasis to detailed substantive testing as a
source of audit evidence.
2. Generally, the performance of detailed substantive tests 
requires some knowledge of the system of internal 
control.
3. The extent of systems examination is limited to that 
considered necessary for the substantive tests.
4. Since substantive testing requires some prior Icn owl edge 
of the system, it is the systems examination which must 
be performed first.
THE THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship 
between the systems and substantive evidence. This relation­
ship is examined through a study of problems associated with 
a systems approach to the audit and problems associated with 
a substantive approach. The principal problem associated with 
the systems approach is how much evidence to take in support of 
the figures in the accounts on the basis of the system and, 
therefore, how much reduction in substantive testing is per­
missible? To examine this problem it is necessary to examine 
the nature of internal control as audit evidence.
Chapter 2 of the thesis sets out a view of internal control as 
audit evidence which is consistent with conventional thinking. 
It then reviews current techniques for combining the systems
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and substantive evidence and identifies their operational 
difficulties.
Basically, these techniques require the selection of confidence 
level, and therefore sample size, for the substantive test to 
vary with the auditor’s assessment of the system. Such tech­
niques closely follow the ideas of the systems approach since 
the strength of the system determines the confidence level and 
hence sample size for the substantive testing.
Although the role of the systems examination as a source of 
evidence in support of the financial statements is most 
clearly recognised through a study of the systems approach, 
it is relevant to all audit approaches which wish to place 
some audit reliance upon the system. In addition to the role 
of systems examination as a source of audit evidence to be 
combined with the substantive evidence, this thesis identifies 
and examines two other important roles for the systems exami­
nation in its relationship with the substantive testing. These 
two roles are more easily recognised through a study of the 
substantive approach and its associated problems than through 
a study of the systems approach.
Nevertheless, the two roles apply to all audit approaches 
(including the systems approach) which involve some reliance 
on substantive testing.
Role No. 1
The auditor’s traditional concern with the systems assessment 
as the determinant of confidence levels appropriate to the 
substantive testing has taken attention away from a possibly
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equally important connection between the systems assessment 
and substantive testing. The value of substantive testing 
is significantly increased when statistical sampling techniques 
are employed. There is a range of statistical sampling tech­
niques available to the auditor (generally these techniques 
are categorised as ’variables* or ’monetary unit*). In any 
given circumstance, a particular technique may be inefficient 
or misleading and selection of the right technique is enhanced 
through prior knowledge based to a significant extent on 
systems examination. The systems examination, therefore, 
should be regarded as a significant contributor to prior 
knowledge which enables the auditor to select the appropriate 
statistical technique for the substantive testing.
Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the importance of a prior systems 
examination to the selection of an appropriate statistical 
technique.
Role No. 2
The auditor’s traditional concern with the systems assessment 
as the determinant of confidence levels has taken attention 
away from the important role of the systems examination in 
enabling the auditor to assess the quality of evidence used 
to substantiate individual transactions or balances selected 
in the sample. Much evidence used to substantiate individual 
items selected in a substantive sample is itself either pro­
cessed or generated by the system and cannot, therefore, be 
properly assessed without a study of the system and its 
internal controls. The relevance of the systems examination
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to an assessment of the quality of substantive evidence 
processed or generated by the accounting system is discussed 
in Chapter 5*
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CHAPTER 2
SYSTEMS EXAMINATION AS A SOURCE OP AUDIT EVIDENCE 
This chapter examines the role of the auditor's systems 
examination from the perspective of the systems approach 
to the audit* The systems approach attempts to maximise the 
auditor's reliance on the support given to the financial 
statement figures hy the system. In order to understand the 
nature of this support it is necessary to review the nature 
of the systems examination typically conducted by the auditor. 
This review provides the first section of this chapter. It is 
found that the auditor's evaluation of internal control is 
essentially subjective and that consequently it is necessary to 
combine the audit evidence provided by the systems examination 
with substantive testing. The second section of this chapter 
examines the difficulties inherent in current proposals for the 
combination of these two sources of evidence,
A CQWEMTIONAL APPROACH TO THE SYSTEMS EXA]V[INATION
The systems examination is conveniently divided into four stages;
ascertainment, identification, compliance and evaluation.
Ascertainment
This is the first stage and is normally achieved by a combination 
of the internal control questionnaire (l.C.Q,.) and a "walk­
through" of one of each kind of transaction. A walkthrough 
should be regarded not as a test of the operation of a client's 
system, but rather as a me.ans of ensuring that effective com­
munication has taken place between the auditor and client per­
sonnel who are explaining the procedures. However, a combi­
nation of l.C.Q. and "walkthrough" for ascertaining the system
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of internal control can be criticised as inadequate on at least 
two grounds. Firstly, there is the dynamic nature of internal 
control. "Internal control is people", and the pressures which 
motivate people may change. In reviewing internal control, the 
auditor may fail to realise that states of internal control 
during the period under review, are undergoing continual change 
due to the influence of people within the organisation. Secondly, 
and this is connected with the previous point, there will exist 
in any organisation involving people an informal as well as 
formal system of internal control. Conventional techniques are 
particularly inadequate for ascertaining the informal system of 
internal control in the area of relationships between personnel, 
and for this purpose a positional analysis of internal control 
may be needed. (9)
Thus, if the auditor only uses the techniques of l.C.Q, and 
the "walkthrough" he runs two distinct risks,
1. He may ascertain only one of several internal control 
systems operating during the period.
2. He may ascertain the formal internal control system 
rather than the informal system which actually operates.
Internal Control is People
To borrow a phrase, "internal control is people". A system 
of internal control is operated by people who are expected to 
perform and report in the manner prescribed by the system. But, 
the pressures which motivate the people in the "system" may 
change sufficiently that they cease to act in prescribed 
fashion, whereupon the internal control may lose its effective­
ness .
It is difficult to evaluate the people who operate internal
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control procedures.
The behaviour of people in an organisation is influenced by 
the management style of the organisation. For instance, enter­
prises have been designated "mechanistic" or "organismic", 
dependent upon the amount of freedom of action which indivi­
duals within the organisation possess. Essentially mechanistic 
enterprises have rigid rules, clearly defined job specifi­
cations and hierachy of authority, whereas organismic enterprises 
represent a more flexible approach. Behaviour differs greatly 
between these differing environments with significant impli­
cations for the system of internal control. Given the systems 
approach, it is imperative that professional auditors are 
trained to a much higher standard than at present in the area 
of management style and its implications.
In practice, certain assumptions about the motivation of people 
are made by the auditor, and it follows that where these 
assumptions do not hold, reliance on internal control must be 
reassessed. The following have been identified (10) as some 
of the assumptions frequently made :
a) the threat of prompt exposure will deter an individual 
from committing fraud;
b) if there are proper organisational controls segregating 
important functions, people will recognise and report 
irregularities which come to their attention;
c) the probability of collusion is low since people will be 
deterred by the possible consequences of being rejected 
in an attempt to propose fraudulent activities;
d) personal relationships within the organisation will not 
influence or conflict with "formal" relationships 
established by the system;
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e) people will perform only those functions required hy the 
organisational structure;
f) the existence of documentary evidence that an action has 
taken place implies that the action has in fact been 
performed;
g) employees have sufficient training, experience, time and 
motivation to perform their duties competently and 
conscientiously.
In the context of ascertaining the system of internal control, 
assumptions (b), (c), (d), (e) and (g) are all relevant. 
Identification
The second stage in the systems examination is to identify 
those individual controls within the system which are relevant 
to the audit objectives.
An internal control is difficult to define and in a general 
sense it includes any procedure designed to ensure that an 
organisation meets its objectives. A financial accounting 
internal control is any procedure designed to ensure that the 
financial accounts meet their objectives (ie provide a true 
and fair view of the economic activity of the organisation) 
and it is these financial controls with which the auditor is 
primarily concerned. Other internal controls form part of the 
auditor's background knowledge of the client and the client's 
business and, whilst important, they are not as directly rele­
vant as financial controls, to the audit opinion.
Financial controls might include the following ;
a) devising an appropriate and properly integrated system of 
accounts and records.
b) determining the form of general financial supervision and
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control by management, using such means as budgetary 
control, regular interim accounts of suitable frequency, 
and special reports.
c) ensuring that adequate precautions are taken to safeguard 
(and if necessary to duplicate and store separately) 
important records.
d) engaging, training and allocating to specific duties 
management and staff competent to fulfill their 
responsibilities.
and this suggestion is illustrated in figure 2.
Compliance
The third stage in the systems exam inaction is to test that 
relevant internal controls are being applied as prescribed.
A walkthrough of one of each kind of transaction may be suf­
ficient for the purpose of assuring that effective communication 
has taken place between the auditor and client’s staff. It is 
not sufficient evidence on which to assume compliance with the 
ascertained system of internal control, and it has been 
suggested (ll) that for the auditor to arrive at an evaluation 
of internal control on the basis of completing a questionnaire 
and observing a few transactions is tantamount to the stati­
stician's describing a population on the basis of a sample of 
one. The auditor must make a statistically supportable test 
of compliance, although sample size can be reduced by incor­
porating the auditor's subjective prior expectations in a 
Bayesian analysis. A frequent application of statistical 
sampling in the leading UK firms has been attribute sampling 
(normally a form of acceptance sampling) to give a maximum
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potential rate of systems error, although it is doubtful 
whether such maximum potential error rates are of great 
use to the auditor since they are not expressed in value 
terms. Still further difficulties are experienced by those 
using sampling methods to test compliance since -
1) Many controls (such as segregation of duties) do not 
leave an audit trail
and
2) where an audit trail is left, it is not conclusive 
evidence that the control procedure has been performed 
(eg a signature evidencing arithmetic check of an 
invoice).
For the second of the above problems it is sometimes suggested 
that the auditor himself should reperform the control pro­
cedure (eg the auditor himself reperforms the arithmetic 
of the invoice). However, such a reperformance by the 
auditor can be regarded as a substantive test rather than 
a compliance test and justification for this view is given 
in an article by this author (l2).
Establishing compliance is essential to the systems approach 
and yet in many cases, satisfactory compliance evidence may 
be hard to find, especially if reperformance is to be re­
garded as substantive.
Evaluation
Evaluation of internal control is the final stage and there 
are two possibilities. Either an overall subjective assess­
ment can be made or the auditor can employ a more precise 
analysis. The a,rgument in favour of a precise analysis is 
made by Mautz and Mini,
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In analysing internal control, the auditor must deal 
with specifics, not with generalities. The auditor 
must determine whether specific weaknesses exist, the 
irregularities thereby permitted, and the specific 
modifications of his program ca,lied for by these 
conditions. In this way many of the problems associated 
with the overall, more subjective approach to internal 
control evaluation would be eliminated. For instance, 
if the situations by which irregularities are permitted 
are analysed in a logical manner, the circumstances 
under which two auditors would disagree as to the 
presence or absence of weaknesses in a given system 
of internal control should be rare. Personal standards 
could, undoubtedly, affect an auditor's assessment of 
the seriousness of a given weakness (probable irregu­
larity), but not his conclusion as to the presence of 
that weakness.(15)
Also favouring a precise analysis the A.I.C.P.A.'s Committee 
%
on Auditing Procedure states ;
A conceptually logical approach to the auditor's 
evaluation of accounting control, which focuses 
directly on the purpose of preventing or detecting 
material errors and irregularities in financial 
statements, is to apply the following steps in con­
sidering each significant class of transactions and 
related assets involved in audit;
a) Consider the types of errors and irregularities that 
could occur;
b) Determine the accounting control procedures that 
should prevent or detect such errors and irregularities;
c) Determine whether the necessary procedures are pre­
scribed and are being followed satisfactorily;
d) Evaluate any weaknesses - ie types of potential errors 
and irregularities not covered by existing control 
procedures - to determine their effect on (l) the 
nature, timing, or extent of auditing procedures to
be applied, and (2) suggestions to be made to the 
client.(14)
Cushing ( 15) has suggested a mathematical approach which is 
consistent with the A.I.C.P.A. recommendation. In his single 
error - single control case Cushing states that the probability 
of error after application of the control is ;
(1 - Pl)(l - Vz) + (1 - Pl)P2(l - P4) + Pi(l - P;)(l - P5)
3.0 -
where -
= the probability that the process is correctly executed 
prior to administering the control procedure.
Pg = the probability that the control step will detect and
signal an error given that one exists.
P^ = the probability that the control step will not signal
an error given that none exists.
P4 = the probability that the correction step will correct
an error given that one exists and has been signalled.
P^ = the probability that a failure of the control step will
be detected and no correction made, given that the
control signals an error when none exists.
The mathematical approach suggested by Cushing provides a 
conceptual framework in which the auditor can evaluate internal 
controls in terms of numeric error rates. The people problem 
can be illustrated by the problem in assessing P4 , the proba­
bility that the correction step will correct an error given
that one exists and has been signalled. Assuming a low prior 
error rate (l-P^ ) the auditor's sample is unlikely to include 
many errors and almost certainly will not include sufficient 
errors to enable an empirically based statistical conclusion 
about P^ . In these circumstances, the auditor must largely 
base his assessment of P^ on subjective evaluation of the 
people operating the procedure.
Numeric error rates and monetary error rates 
Following Gushing, it is conceptually possible to evaluate 
internal control in terms of the number of likely errors. 
Generally, one internal control system operates on transactions
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of widely varying monetary sizes. (Occasionally a separate 
internal control system will operate, either formally or in­
formally, for large transactions). If an internal control 
system is perfect it will permit no errors of any size.
Numeric and monetary error rates are zero. As soon as an 
internal control system is slightly less than perfect and 
allows, say, just a single error, the problems begin. The 
numeric error ra.te is known (it is 1 divided by the number of 
transactions in the population), but with one exception, the 
probability distribution for monetary error rates is unknown. 
The exception is when -
(1) the single error is known to be an omission of a 
transaction, and
(2) the population is known.
In this circumstance the monetary error will take each trans­
action size with a probability corresponding to the relative 
frequency of the transaction size in the population. In all 
other circumstances the numeric error rate can only be trans­
lated into a monetary rate subjectively. The auditor uses his 
judgement and experience to determine what he thinks is the 
size of the monetary error permitted by the internal control 
system. It follows that for all less than perfect internal 
control systems, numeric error rates can only be translated 
into monetary error rates subjectively and the assessment of 
internal control is subjective rather than objective evidence. 
Kaplan states that an audit population is actually a mix of 
two quite different populations; one consisting of a large 
number of correct items; the other a much smaller population
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of items in error (l6).
Hence, the need to estimate tv;o different parameters in an 
audit population - the error rate and the distribution of 
errors for items found to be in error (1?). An examination 
of internal control only provides information for the first 
of these two parameters.
Qualitative features of compliance errors
The first stage in a precise analysis of internal control is 
to consider the types of error and irregularity which could 
occur. The internal control system is then analysed for each 
error type separately. A classification by error type is a 
classification according to the qualitative features of errors, 
and an exhaustive list of possible error types was prepared by 
Mautz and Sharaf (18). Knowledge of the qualitative character­
istics of errors can assist the auditor in his subjective trans­
lation of numeric error rates into money error rates.
For example,
1. Errors due to misunderstandings are likely to be more 
substantial than errors due to lack of care,
2. Errors of computation are likely to take a wide range of 
values, whereas errors in an original count are likely to 
have a smaller range of values.
3. Errors of omission and overstatement have a theoretical 
limit (the size of thetransaction), whereas there is no 
theoretical limit for understatements.
The extent to which this kind of knowledge can assist the 
auditor is limited, and, hence, an examination of internal 
control provides relatively weak subjective evidence.
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If it is possible for the auditor to express his assessment 
of internal control in money terms he is unlikely to hold 
his assessment with any great conviction.
THE SUBJECTIVE NATURE OF THE SYSTEMS EXAMINATION; A SUMMARY 
The following difficulties with the systems examination have 
been identified;
1. Ascertainment. Techniques used to ascertain the system
of internal control are susceptible to error because of
the dependence of internal control upon the people 
operating the system. The auditor is, in general, 
forced to make assumptions about the people in the 
system and these assumptions may not hold for a part
of the year,
2. Compliance. If the auditor is relying upon the system
as audit evidence then establishing compliance is essential. 
In many cases, however, convincing compliance evidence is 
not available to the auditor. Reperformance of control 
procedures by the auditor may not provide suitable com­
pliance evidence since the items rechecked were probably 
correct before they entered the control.
3. Evaluation. Even the most precise evaluation of internal
controls (for all less than perfect internal controls) is 
not capable of expressing a result in monetary, rather than 
numeric, terms. A result in numeric terms is of only 
limited value to the auditor.
For each of these reasons the auditor's examination of the 
system of internal control is a subjective process.
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COMBINING THE SYSTEM EXAMINATION AND SUBSTANTIVE TESTS 
If the system of internal control is poor, although the 
prohahility of the output of the system being in error is 
increased, it is not conclusive evidence that the output is 
in error. A poor system, in the sense that it does not have 
intrinsic design features which permit the auditor to rely 
upon it as audit evidence, is quite capable of producing 
accurate output since a poor system may fail to detect an 
error once made but does not affect the number of errors 
available for detection. In terms of Cushing’s analysis 
the control procedure does not directly affect Pp, the proba­
bility that the process is correctly executed prior to ad­
ministering the control procedure.
To take a simple example, a system which had no segregation 
of responsibilities would be a poor system from the audit 
point of view, but is quite capable of producing accurate 
output if the employee concerned is both capable and honest,
A good system on the other hand, although reducing the proba­
bility of inaccurate output, is not conclusive evidence of the 
accuracy of that output. A good system should reduce the number 
of errors, but not necessarily their value. It follows that 
internal control, whether good or bad, and whatever the rigour 
and extent of the audit examination, is by itself inconclusive 
evidence of the output and must be combined with evidence 
provided by substantive testing.
Three approaches to the problem of combining the assessment of 
internal control with the sampling evidence of monetary errors 
are considered;
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1. Arbitrary variation of confidence levels of a sample
design as a function of the state of internal control.
2. The A.I.C.P.A, approach given in Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 1, Section 320, Appendix B, paragraph 35 
(the A.I.C.P.A. approach),
3. Utilisation of a Bayesian approach to sample design. 
Arbitrary Variation
There are several examples of arbitrary variation, Willingham 
and Carmichael suggest the following (19).
Relationship of Internal Control 
Effectiveness to Reliability
Evaluation 
of Internal 
Control
Excellent
Good
Pair
Poor
Confidence
Level
75%
90%
95%
999^
Commenting on this approach Smith says:
Although this approach does accomplish the purpose of 
inversely relating sample size and internal control, it 
is difficult to accept as a logical approach. No logical 
basis has been determined for setting the confidence 
level correlation with different states of internal 
control (20),
A more cautious example of an arbitrary relationship is given 
in The Arthur Young Journal (2l);
Evaluation of Internal Controls
Excellent Pair Weak or
Non-existent
Confidence 80 95 97.5
Level to to to
90% 99% 999i
- 56
A third example is related by McRae (2 2):
Evaluation of Internal Confidence
Control System Level
Very good 63%
Average 86%
Rather poor 95%
is linked to the "MITS" system as follows:
Confidence Confidence
Level Factor
63% 1 . 0
86% 2 . 0
95% 3 .0
This approach incorporates the idea that it is imprudent,
even when internal control is excellent, to select a con­
fidence level giving a confidence factor of less than 1 . If 
the confidence factor is less than 1 , the sampling interval 
(j) is greater than the maximum potential error (MPE) and 
hence it is possible for a material item to be untested. Con­
cepts such as the sampling interval (j) and maximum potential
error (MPE) are discussed in Meikle (23)• Although there is 
reasoning behind this suggestion it is, nevertheless, an 
arbitrary approach. All arbitrary approaches can be criticised 
on two grounds;
1 . What is meant by an "excellent" system of internal control, 
a "good" system etc? A 10% probability of material error 
might be regarded as "excellent" by one person, but only as 
"good" by another. If the purpose of the arbitrary approach 
is to promote uniformity within a firm (albeit uniform
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application of an arbitrary procedure) then it could 
fail because of the subjective nature of the terms 
"excellent", "good", etc*
2. The linking of internal control evaluation and confidence 
level is not only arbitrary but it is also a relationship 
with no direct linking and, therefore, an extremely diffi­
cult relationship for the auditor to visualise. This is 
in contrast to the Bayesian approach, discussed later, 
where the subjective element is a prior probability distri­
bution more easily visualised by the auditor.
A.I.C.P.A. Approach
The A.I.C.P.A, have suggested that internal control and sub­
stantive tests can be linked according to the mathematical law 
of joint probability (see table 1 ).
Table 1
Probability of 
Internal Control Confidence Overall
Allowing 
Material Error
Level Confidence
(1) (2) (3)
10% 93% 95%
50% 90% 95%
30% 83% 95%
10% 50% 95%
Column 1 is the auditor's subjective assessment of the proba­
bility of the internal control system permitting sufficient 
errors to cause the account to be incorrect by a material 
amount. It is not the probability of an individual transaction
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being in error by a material amount. Column 2 is the required 
confidence level from the substantive test, in order that the 
overall confidence in the accounts figure should be 95^
(column 3)•
More correctly, rather than column (2) being the confidence 
level employed in the substantive test it should be regarded 
as 1 - B (the beta risk associated with the substantive test). 
Only in the case of dollar unit sampling (as opposed to 
variables sampling) will 1 - B and the confidence level be 
the same figure. The A.I.C.P.A. approach recognises that the 
risk of failing to detect a material error is based on two 
separate risks -
1. the risk of internal control permitting a material 
error.
2. the risk of the sampling plan failing to conclude 
that there is a material error. (Beta risk)
The A.I.C.P.A, procedure gives an overall confidence which is 
consistent with both the subjective assessment of internal 
control and the objective evaluation provided by the substan­
tive test. In this respect it may be regarded as a Bayesian 
approach. However, unlike the Bayesian approach, alternative 
hypotheses and the auditor's entire probability distribution 
are not considered. It should also be noted that three of the 
twenty-one members of the Committee on Auditing Procedure dis­
sented from the inclusion of the A.I.C.P.A. approach in 
S.A,P. No. 54» (later consolidated into Statement on Auditing
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Standards No. 1 .) They felt it may he misunderstood in 
application as prescribing a generally appropriate relation­
ship between internal control and substantive tests. Clearly, 
they did not feel that the A.I.C.P.A, approach was generally 
appropriate. Although their precise reasons were not given, 
the failure to consider the auditor’s entire probability 
distribution in Bayesian analysis is a technical weakness.
In addition, the approach suffers from operational problems. 
Operational difficulty of A.I.C.P.A. Aunroach
It can be seen from table 1 that when internal control is very 
poor (eg 10% probability of material error) very little of the 
overall confidence is drawn from the assessment of internal 
control. As the assessment of internal control improves more 
of the overall confidence is drawn from the internal control 
and at an increasing rate. A shift in column (l) from 10%o 
to 30% causes a shift in column (2) from 93% to 90%. However, 
a shift in column (l) from 30% to 10% causes a decrease in 
column (2) from 83% to 50%. This problem can be represented 
mathematically as follows:
i = probability of internal control allowing a material 
error
s = confidence level for substantive test
i(l - s) = 0.05
i - is = 0,05
Differentiating with respect to i
1 - i ^  - 8  = 0
di
ds = 1 - 8
di i
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But s
ds
di
i - 0.05 
i
= 1 - fi - 0.05\
i  ^ .2 ^
0.05
.2
Thus,
__i_ dsdi
0.7 0.10
0.5 0.20
0.5 0.56
0.1 5.00
It can be shown, therefore, that the confidence from 
sampling becomes increasingly sensitive to shifts in the 
auditor's assessment of internal control as internal con­
trol improves. Let us consider the following possibilities.
1. Internal control is poor (eg 70% probability of material 
error). In this case the sampling confidence is not 
sensitive (-^ = O.IO) to the auditor's assessment of 
internal control. The auditor does not have to be precise 
in his assessment. However, in this case nearly all the 
overall confidence is drawn from the sample and internal 
control only plays a small part.
2. Internal control is good (eg 10% probability of material 
error). In this case the sampling confidence is sensitive 
to the auditor's assessment of internal control. (-^  = 5.0). 
This high level of sensitivity requires the auditor to be 
precise in his assessment of internal control. Given the
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nature of internal control this requirement is likely 
to render the A.I.C.P.A, approach inoperational,
To summarise the argument,
When sampling confidence is insensitive to the assessment 
of internal control, internal control is unimportant.
When internal control is important, the sampling con­
fidence is highly sensitive to the assessment of internal 
control. This leads to operational difficulties. This 
argument is covered in a published note contributed by 
this author (24).
It is doubtful whether an auditor should use an assessment of 
internal control better than S =0.3 (50% probability of 
material error). In this case ^  = O.56. This would mean 
a reluctance to use sampling confidences lower than 85%, 
A.I.C.P.A. Approach; Conclusion
Although it is correct to say that the probability of material 
error is based on the probability of internal control allowing 
material error and the probability of the sample test failing 
to recognise material error, the A.I.C.P.A. approach does not 
provide a satisfactory detailed method of combining the 
probabilities.
The Bayesian Approach
There are two ways in which the Bayesian approach can be 
employed to link internal control and sampling evidence,
1, Indirectly via the "pre-audit sample" concept to examine 
possible confidence levels for a conventional sampling 
plan.
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2. Directly, ie the auditor formulates the prior probability 
distribution of error and combines this with the sample 
result in a full Bayesian exercise.
Pre-audit sample
The pre-audit sample concept is based on the fact that when 
the prior probability distribution is a beta distribution, 
it combines with the results of a binomial sample to give a 
posterior distribution which is itself a beta distribution.
The beta distribution is, in general,
f(E) = KE^”  ^(l -
and when r = 1 and n = 2
f(E) = K
Thus, the situation of equal priors (the prior probability 
distribution is level) is described by a beta distribution 
with r = 1 and n = 2. It follows that any beta probability
distribution can be regarded as a Bayesian combination of level
priors and a binomial sample. This binomial sample is termed 
the "pre-audit sample".
Let us assume -
1. An audit sample reveals no errors
and
2, The auditor feels he has a posterior confidence 
(ie that derived from the sample and internal 
control) of 99%»
Then the following results are implied by the "pre-audit 
sample " concept;
45
Confidence Percentage saving in
chosen for sample size due to
sampling reliance on
plan internal control
0%
95 55
80 65
65 78
If a sampling confidence of 63% is chosen, the auditor is 
using his assessment of internal control to justify a 78% 
reduction in his sampling work given equal priors.
Teitlebaum (25) has commented that in view of the weak sub­
jective nature of internal control evidence, 78% may be 
regarded as far too high and, hence, a sampling confidence 
of 63% as far too low. The pre-audit sample concept gives 
useful insights into the problem of selecting confidence levels, 
but does not directly provide the auditor with a technique for 
combining sampling and non-sampling evidence. Such a technique 
is the full Bayesian exercise.
Full Bayesian Exercise
Presumably, an auditor who uses dollar unit sampling could 
specify a subjective prior probability distribution of error 
and combine this with his objective sample result by means of 
Bayes theorem. Many authors have suggested the value of 
Bayesian techniques in auditing, including Kraft (26),
Sorensen ( 27) and Tracy ( 28) It is interesting to note that 
even though these pioneering articles are around ten years old, 
this author knows of no formal and explicit involvement of
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Bayesian techniques in auditing at the present time.
However, Bayesian techniques are Implicitly employed on
a wide scale. As a simple example of the Bayesian approach,
assume the following prior distribution -
Reported value £1M
Overstated by Probability
£ 5000 0.05
15000 0 .10
25000 0.50
30000 0.25
35000 0.20
40000 0.10
1.00
Suppose also that in a random sample of 100 pounds, 0 errors 
are found, (The example, for illustrative purposes assumes 
0 errors are found. Further illustration of the Bayesian 
calculations may be found in any of the references just 
mentioned). In these circumstances the results of a Bayesian 
analysis and the results provided by the A.I.O.P.A. procedure 
may be compared. Columns (9) and (lO) of table 2 give the 
results of the Bayesian and A.I.O.P.A. methods respectively 
and it can be seen from these two columns, that whatever error 
rate (other than 8.005) is considered material, the results 
given by the two methods differ significantly.
Psychological conservatism
One of the major contributions of the Bayesian approach is 
that it provides the only posterior probability distribution 
which is consistent with the prior probability distribution and
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(1)
Error
Rate
(2)
Priors
(3)
Cumulative
Priors
(4)
Likelihoods
(5)
Posteriors 
assuming 
level priors 
(4) % scaling 
factor
0.005 0.05 1 .0 0 0 .6 0 5 8 0 .6060
0.015 0 .1 0 0.95 0 .2 2 0 6 0 .2 2 0 8
0.025 0,30 0 .8 5 0.0795 0.0797
0.030 0.25 0 .5 5 0.0476 0 .0478
0.035 0 .2 0 0.30 0 .0 2 8 4 0 .0286
0.040 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0.0169 0.0171
0 ,9 9 8 8 1 .0 000
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Bayesian
Posteriors Bayesian
Cumulative (7) X scale Cumulative
likelihoods (2) X (4) factor Posteriors ill X (6)
1 .0000 0.05029 0.3172 1 .0 0 0 0 1 .0000
0.5940 0 .02206 0.2311 0 .6 8 2 8 0.3745
0.1732 0 .0 2385 0 .2 4 9 8 0.4517 0,1472
0.0935 0.01190 0.1247 0.2019 0.0514
0.0457 0.00568 0.0595 0.0772 0.0137
0.0171 0.00169 0.0177 0.0177 0.0017
0.09547 1 .0000
TABLE 2
OALOULATIOm OF RESULTS GIVEN BY THE BAYESIAU AHB AJCPA METHODS
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the sample results. Of course, man can judgementally 
revise his prior probabilities in the light of sample 
evidence, but experiments conducted by psychologists 
demonstrate that man is not a competent intuitive stati­
stician, For example, in an experiment by Phillips and 
Edwards (29)» subjects, when acting intuitively, consistently 
failed to revise their prior probabilities to the extent 
prescribed by Bayes Theorem. People intuitively extract 
less meaning from sample evidence than Bayesian techniques 
would suggest and this phenomenum is termed ’’conservatism".
It is, therefore, undesirable that auditors intuitively com­
bine objective and subjective probabilities since this will 
result in conservatism and inefficiency.
The design of Phillips and Edwards’ experiments was along the 
following lines : consider 10 bags each containing 100 poker
chips, but with r bags containing predominantly red chips and 
(lO - r) bags containing predominantly blue chips. Predomin­
antly red bags contain p red chips and q blue chips whilst 
predominantly blue bags contain q red chips and p blue chips 
(p> q). One of the 10 bags is selected at random and from the 
chosen bag the subject is allowed to sample 20 chips (with re­
placement). From his knowledge of the sample result and the 
design of the experiment, the subject was asked to give his 
intuitive assessment of the probability of the chosen bag being 
predominantly red or predominantly blue. These intuitive proba­
bilities were compared with the objective probabilities calcu­
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lated by Bayes Theorem, The experiment was repeated using 
different subjects and different figures for r, p and q; 
the subjects were five volunteer University of Michigan 
undergraduates. These experiments did not concern auditors 
or auditing, but a recent experiment by Corless ( 30) also 
found evidence of conservatism, this time, when a comparison 
was made between the Bayesian revised and judgementally re­
vised distributions of auditors. It is this psychological 
conservatism which causes the Bayesian method to be more 
efficient than judgemental methods and Corless concludes that 
the use of Bayesian techniques may enable the auditor to 
achieve a given level of assurance with a smaller sample size. 
Significant difficulties of the Bayesian Approach 
There are two primary reasons why an explicit Bayesian approach 
does not at the present time provide the auditor with a prac­
tical solution. They are :
1. Bayesian revised distributions are unreliable when the 
sampling and non-sampling (internal control evaluation) 
evidence contradict,
2, There is considerable doubt whether satisfactory prior 
probability distributions can be elicited from auditors.
Contradictory evidence
When the error rate is material and unexpected, the prior 
probabilities could be much lower than the probabilities com­
puted from the sample result. Bayes theorem combines these 
two probabilities mathematically to give the posterior proba­
bilities consistent with the priors and the sample result.
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However, following the sample result the auditor may no longer
he confident of his prior distribution, and it follows that he
should not rely on the Bayesian revised distribution. Corless
comments (in Corless' experiment 10 per cent is regarded as
a material error rate);
It may be that the judgementa,lly revised distributions 
are a better reflection of the meaning of the audit 
evidence than the Bayesian revised distributions when 
the sampling evidence contradicts the non-sampling 
evidence. That is, it seems rational that as an 
auditor obtains evidence which contradicts other 
evidence he has obtained, he becomes less certain 
as to what the error rate is ; he does not become 
more certain that the error rate is somewhere be­
tween the smaller error rates suggested by the non­
sampling evidence and the 10 per cent sample error 
rate (31).
When the sampling evidence contradicts the non-sampling evidence, 
it may be reasonable, given the subjective nature of the non­
sampling evidence, that the auditor should seek to give far 
greater weight to the sampling rather than the non-sampling 
evidence, and this weighting is not easily facilitated by the 
Bayesian approach.
Eliciting Prior Probability Distributions
A Bayesian revised distribution can only be as reliable as the 
subjective prior probability distribution on which it is (in 
part) based. In most audit circumstances it is likely that 
appropriate parameters can be chosen for the beta distribution 
(f(E) = KE^  ^(1~E)^  ^ )^ so as to satisfactorily represent the 
continuous prior probability distribution of the auditor.
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Good internal 
control
EXAMPLES
DISTRIBUTIONS
Error rate
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Poor internal 
control
f (e)
Error rate 
(e)
Given a suitable choice of parameters the beta distribution can 
be made to peak close to zero and tail off to the right (this 
representing a siutation of good internal control) or parameters 
can be chosen so as to produce a much flatter curve representing 
poor internal control*
Corless* Experiment
The feasibility of obtaining reliable prior probability distri­
butions from auditors was investigated in the experiment by 
Corless. 88 Certified Public. Accountants participated in this 
audit experiment; they each received two audit cases concerning 
payroll, one with strong and the other with weak internal con­
trol; a, set of questions designed to investigate their prior 
probabilities for payroll error; a hypothetical set of sample 
results and a second set of questions designed to investigate 
their judgementally revised probabilities in each case.
In the first place Corless was simply concerned to discover 
whether auditors would be willing and able to provide answers 
to questions designed to investigate their prior probabilities 
for payroll error. It was found that auditors were willing, in 
this experimental study, to provide answers from which prior
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probability distributions could be constructed. By answering 
one question, the auditor specified the values of the first 
quartile, median and third quartile of a probability distri­
bution. From this information, the experimentor was able to 
construct a beta distribution and compute the values of its 
mean and variance. Some doubt must remain, however, whether 
auditors would be quite so willing to release the necessary 
answers in a non-experimental situation. Corless concludes :
It must also be realised that auditors may be less 
willing to specify information about prior distri­
butions for real audit situations when they are aware 
that these prior distributions will be used in deter­
mining the kind of professional opinion to be rendered 
(or whether to gather more evidence).
Nevertheless, the fact that all the auditors who par­
ticipated in this study specified all information re­
quested strongly suggests that auditors are willing to 
specify information from which prior distributions can 
be constructed ( 52) .
In the second place, Corless was concerned to discover the shape 
of the prior probability distributions obtained from auditors.
It was found that whilst most of the prior distributions had 
the majority of the probability concentrated on small error 
rates, there was considerable variability among the distributions 
assessed by different auditors for each audit case. Hence, 
auditors were externally inconsistent in the sense that the 
shapes of their individual beta distributions did not closely 
correspond with each other. To some extent this variation 
amongst auditors must be expected since prior probability distri­
butions are subjective and will vary from individual to indi­
vidual. However, it might have been hoped that individuals with 
with the same professional training would possess prior
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probability distributions which were broadly similar, Gorless
suggests that some of the variability between auditors would
decrease in a non-experimental situation.
It is possible that different auditors read different 
things into the audit cases when they are not certain 
as to the meaning of some of the facts given in the 
cases (whereas in real audit situations the auditor 
could resolve these uncertainties), (35)
The variability of the prior probability distributions tended 
to throw doubt on their reliability. Corless was concerned to 
examine how well the prior probability distributions obtained 
really reflected the auditors’ beliefs about the audit popu­
lation, and a sub-experiment was organised. When providing 
information for the construction of a prior distribution the 
auditor was asked two questions. By answering one question, 
the auditor specified the values of the first quartile, median 
and third quartile of a probability distribution and from this 
information the experimentor was able to construct a beta proba­
bility distribution. By answering the other question the 
auditor specified the probability that the actual error rate 
was contained in each of the following intervals; zero to 0.01;
0.01 to 0.02; 0.02 to 0.05; 0,05 to 0.10, and over 0,10, and
from this information the experimentor was able to construct a 
discrete distribution. In Corless’ experiment the level of con­
sistency between the two distributions was taken to indicate 
how well the distributions reflected the auditor’s belief. In 
fact, Corless found considerable inconsistencies between the 
two distributions. Hence, auditors were internally inconsistent 
in the sense that when giving two different sets of information
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from which prior distributions could be constructed, they gave 
two sets of information which were inconsistent,
Corless also examined the effect of the auditor’s audit and 
statistical experience on his choice of prior probability dis­
tribution, He found, rather surprisingly, that the extent of 
audit or statistical experience was not a factor, whereas the 
kind of audit experience did influence the auditor’s choice, 
Corless reported the following (expected) results
It was found that the prior distributions had more 
probability concentrated on small amounts of error 
when the internal control is stronger. It was also 
observed that auditors whose clients have stronger 
internal control tend to assess prior distributions 
having more probability concentrated on small amounts 
of error than do auditors whose clients have weaker 
internal control. (54)
The following result, however, might not be expected ;-
Differences in the amount of audit experience and 
differences in the statistical background of the 
auditor were not found to affect the assessment 
of prior distributions. (55)
In conclusion, therefore, Corless found that auditors are
willing to specify information from which prior distributions
can be constructed, but there remain serious doubts as to how
reliable and effective these distributions might be,
COMBINING THE SYSTEM EXAMIMATIOM AND SUBSTANTIVE TESTING;
A SUMMARY
Three approaches to the problem of combining the assessment of 
internal control with sampling evidence of monetary errors have 
been considered;
1. Arbitrary variation of confidence levels of a sample 
design as a function of the state of internal control.
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2. The A.I.G.P.A. approach given in Statement on Auditing 
Standards, No.l, Section 320, Appendix B, paragraph 35*
3. A Bayesian approach.
Arbitrary Variation
The first of these possibilities is found unsatisfactory for
the following reasons :
1. It is difficult to provide any definitive criteria as to 
what constitutes an "excellent", "good", "poor" (or 
whatever other categories are permitted) system of internal 
control. Without such criteria the arbitrary variation 
method is likely to degenerate into a method dependent 
upon the judgement of the individual auditor as to the 
appropriate description of the internal control. Com­
prehensive guidelines as to what constitutes each category 
of internal control are desirable if the method is to be
at all convincing,
2, Even if such comprehensive guidelines exist, the linkage 
between each category of internal control and related 
confidence level is essentially arbitrary and with little 
or no logical support.
The A.I.e.P.A. Approach
The second possibility is found unsatisfactory for the
following reasons :
1, As internal control improves the selection of the sampling 
confidence level becomes more and more sensitive to the 
assessment of internal control. Given the subjective 
nature of internal control assessments, this leads to 
operational difficulties.
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2. The result of applying the A.I.O.P.A. procedure can 
diverge significantly from the result obtained by 
applying a Bayesian exercise in the same circumstances. 
Given that the Bayesian approach has the more rigorous 
mathematical underpinning, this divergence casts doubt 
on the adequacy of the A.I.O.P.A. procedure.
The Bayesian Approach
Finally, the Bayesian approach, whilst promising, suffers 
from two crucial drawbacks;
1. Bayesian revised distributions are unreliable when the 
evidence of the internal control assessment and sub­
stantive test results contradict,
2. There is considerable doubt whether satisfactory prior 
probability distributions can be elicited from auditors.
Thus the investigation conducted in this chapter suggests that 
there is no satisfactory method of combining the internal con­
trol assessment and substantive test results. This, together 
with the subjective nature of internal control highlight the 
problems of the systems approach which seeks to maximise 
reliance on the systems examination and assessment,
CONCLUSION
This chapter has demonstrated the subjectivity of systems 
evidence, which is shown to result from three distinct causes:
a) techniques used to ascertain the system of internal
control are susceptible to error because of the dependence 
of internal control upon the people operating the system 
(a "people" problem).
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b) In many cases convincing compliance evidence is not 
available to the auditor (a "compliance" problem).
c) Even the most precise evaluation of internal controls is 
not capable of expressing a result in monetary, rather 
than numeric terms (an "evaluation" problem).
Since the subjectivity results from no less than three 
distinct causes, each one of which can be a major factor, 
systems evidence is likely to be subjective in all but a small 
minority of circumstances.
It is the relative subjectivity of the systems evidence which 
requires it to be combined with substantive evidence. As 
stated in the introductory chapter, the principal problem 
associated with the systems approach is how much evidence to 
take in support of the figures in the accounts on the basis of 
the systems and therefore how much reduction in substantive 
testing is permissible given the subjective nature of systems 
evidence? This chapter demonstrates that the audit profession 
is some way from solving this problem.
Three approaches to the problem of combining the assessment 
of internal control with sampling evidence of monetary errors 
have been studied and each is found wanting;
1) arbitrary variation of confidence levels of a sample
design as a function of the state of internal control.
2) The A.I.O.P.A. approach given in Statement on Auditing
Standards No 1, Section 320, Appendix B, paragraph 35 *
3) A Bayesian approach.
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At the present time, therefore, there is no totally 
satisfactory formal method of combining the systems and 
substantive evidence in existence. The traditional role 
of systems evaluation is to enable a reduction in levels of 
detailed substantive tests. In a sense, therefore, the 
traditional role of systems evaluation is to serve as a 
source of substantive evidence. This chapter has highlighted 
the difficulties involved in the treatment of systems evalu­
ation as a form of substantive evidence.
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CHAPTER 5
MONETARY UNIT SAMPLING AND PRIOR INP'ORMATION
The problems of the substantive approach to the audit are
twofold s
1) how many sample items to include in the substantive 
testing?
2) what evidence to choose to substantiate the sample 
items chosen?
The first of these questions is brought into focus by a study 
of those statistical sampling techniques presently used by the 
auditor to evaluate sample results. Doth this and the following 
chapter examine problems associated with the use of various 
statistical sampling techniques. This chapter examines those 
techniques commonly referred to as 'monetary unit sampling' and 
the following chapter examines 'variables sampling' plans.
Both examinations are addressed to the two propositions that ;
1. There is no single statistical sampling technique which is 
appropriate in all circumstances.
2. The chances of making the proper selection of statistical 
sampling plan improve as a result of examination of the 
accounting system and its internal controls.
Turning to the first proposition, there are two reasons why any 
particular sampling plan may be inappropriate ;
1) the sampling scheme can be used in circumstances where it 
may produce inaccurate or misleading results.
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For example, the confidence level stated by the sampling plan 
may he but the true confidence level is lower at y96. The 
two confidence levels are sometimes called the 'nominal* and 
'real* confidence levels and the danger from the auditor's 
point of view arises whenever nominal confidence is above real 
confidence. Use of the sampling plan in such circumstances 
provides the auditor with a false sense of security.
2) The sampling plan can be used in circumstances where it 
produces results inefficiently.
For example, the confidence level stated by the sampling plan 
may be but the true confidence level is higher at This
causes the auditor to select larger sample sizes than ought to 
be necessary to achieve acceptable confidence levels. Where 
nominal confidence is lower than real confidence, the sampling 
plan is said to be 'conservative*. Although undesirable this 
is clearly less dangerous than the ’misleading results’ case.
If, for each available sampling plan in turn, it can be estab­
lished that there exists a set of realistic circumstances in 
which the plan gives the auditor misleading results or the plan 
is unacceptably inefficient, then the first of the two propo­
sitions to which this chapter is addressed, is established.
This chapter identifies such circumstances for the class of 
statistical sampling techniques known as monetary unit 
sampling.
The second proposition
Two reasons can be identified as to why any sampling plan may 
require the auditor to obtain prior information. They are -
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1) information necessary to enable the plan to be operated 
without producing misleading or inefficient results.
2) information necessary to avoid the sampling scheme from 
being used in circumstances where it produces misleading 
or inefficient results.
In the first category positive use is made of the prior infor­
mation to enable the sampling scheme to operate satisfactorily. 
In the second case negative use is made of the prior information 
which simply identifies the fact that the particular sampling 
plan cannot be used. The two categories could, therefore, be 
termed positive and negative prior information. An example of 
positive prior information is knowledge of the value of each 
population item when used as the basis of stratification for 
stratified variables sampling. An example of negative prior 
information is knowledge of the large variation of values of 
sample items when used to exclude the use of mean per unit 
sampling.
This chapter identifies and classifies the prior information 
required before the selection and operation of monetary unit 
sampling schemes, and it is shown that, to a significant degree, 
this prior information (whether positive or negative) comes 
from a study of the accounting system and its internal controls. 
If this is the case then it follows that the chances of making 
the proper selection of statistical technique improve as a 
result of examination of the accounting system.
Monetary Unit Sampling
A monetary unit sampling plan has been widely employed for many
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years by Deloitte Haskins and Sells (The H & S plan) and a 
slightly different version has been adopted by Clarkson 
Gordon in Canada and Arthur Young McClelland Moores in the 
United Kingdom, This latter plan is called dollar unit 
sampling (DUS). Mathematicians have been largely re­
sponsible for the development of both plans and this thesis 
makes no attempt to explain or justify their theoretical basis. 
There was virtually no discussion of monetary sampling in the 
auditing literature until publication of details of the H & S 
plan in a study by Meikle (56) and an important paper on DUS 
by Teitlebaum (57). Monetary unit sampling has now, however, 
found its way into established texts (58) and is widely used 
in practice, there being an estimated 100,000 annual appli­
cations in the United States.
In spite of its many advantages, there are a number of diffi­
culties involved, any one of which could lead to misleading or 
inefficient results:
1) there is a problem in devising a suitable scheme for 
errors of understatement.
2) in certain circumstances monetary unit sampling gives 
indeterminate results.
5) monetary unit sampling has been criticised for not allowing 
the auditor to give more weight to error prone areas.
In order to establish the second of the two propositions, this 
chapter investigates the prior information necessary to avoid 
each of these three difficulties. In so far as these diffi­
culties are unavoidable (even with the availability of prior
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information i.e. only negative prior information is available) 
then the first proposition is also established.
ERRORS OF UNDERSTATEMENT
Understatements and omissions are the achilles heel of 
monetary unit sampling, since although the theoretical 
limit for the overstatement of an item in the population 
is the size of the item,. there is no theoretical limit
to the possible understatement. Moreover, the greater the 
understatement the less the chance of the item being selected 
in a GMA sample and an item which is reported as zero
(an omission) has no chance at all of selection. One school 
of thought therefore, is that MUS is completely unsuited to 
the problem of understatements and that its use should be limited 
to tests for overstatements. Teitlebaum does not regard this 
as a serious problem since he argues that the audit objective 
is to express an opinion on reported book values rather than 
the population of true values (59)» UU8 is certainly compatible 
with this audit objective, but it is an audit objective of 
doubtful validity. In this author's view an opinion on re­
ported book values should be with reference to the population 
of true values. The audit objective is to discover overstate­
ments and understatements, although the auditor's ability to 
detect overstatements is certainly greater than his ability to 
detect understatements, and perhaps this fact should be given 
formal recognition in the audit report.
The redeeming factor for MUS is that many audit tests for under­
statement can be re-organised into tests for overstatement by
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means of a 'reciprocal* population. 
The 'double entry* matrix
Error A L I B
Assets (A) U 0 u u 0
Liabilities (L) Ü u 0 0 u
Income (I) Ü u 0 0 Ü
Expenses (E) TJ 0 Ü u 0
In many cases where the primary objective is to test for under­
statement, it is possible, as a result of the double entry 
system, to find a 'reciprocal* population to test for over­
statement. This is shown by the 'double entry* matrix, although 
there are 4 possible situations where there is no reciprocal 
population. They are -
1. Assets (U), Liabilities (u)
2. Assets (U), Income (tr)
3. Expenses (u ) .  Liabilities (u)
4. Expenses (u). Income (U)
Thege four oases are extracted from the double entry matrix as 
being the combinations which involve understatements only.
Source Documents
Another approach to the problem of finding a reciprocal popu­
lation is to test the accounting system's source documents for 
overstatement. An illustration is given by Stronge and Stewart:
If the object is to test for understatement of the 
population, then there is little point in selecting 
from what is already recorded. The selection must 
be made from some 'reciprocal* population, the over­
statement of which may imply the understatement of 
the population of primary interest. For example, one
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v;ay of testing for the understatement of sales is to 
test despatches for overstatement (a despatch may be 
regarded as overstated if the sale has not been
billed). (40)
Similarly, an overstatement of goods received notes can imply 
an understatement of assets or expenses. A frequent problem 
with source documents, however, is that they are not expressed 
in money units and this makes CT€A sampling inoperable.
Schemes for including understatements
In spite of the conceptual difficulties, monetary unit sampling 
plans do evaluate understatements without recourse to a re­
ciprocal population. The following paragraphs briefly outline 
and discuss various ways in which understatements are evaluated.
With monetary unit sampling, the number of overstated pounds 
found in the sample may be used:
(1) to give an estimate of the number of overstated pounds in 
the population. This estimate is termed the most likely 
error (MLE) for overstatement.
(2) to give, with a stated level of confidence, a maximum 
figure for the potential overstatement in the population.
This figure is termed the upper error limit (u e l) for 
overstatement.
(3) to give, with a stated level of confidence, a minimum 
figure for the potential overstatement in the population.
This figure is termed the lower error limit (lEL) for 
overstatement•
Similarly, based on the understated pounds in the sample, it is 
possible to calculate the MLE, UEL and LEL for understatement.
In both LTJS and the H & S plan, overstatements and understatements
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are separately evaluated to give not one sided precision limits 
but an appropriate bracket (for both UEL and LEL) around the 
most likely error. In DUS, to evaluate net overstatement, upper 
error limit for the overstatement (ignoring understatements) is 
reduced by the most likely understatement (ignoring overstate­
ments). To evaluate net understatements, the upper error limit 
for understatement (ignoring overstatements) is reduced by the 
most likely overstatement (ignoring understatements). The 
H & S plan adopts a different procedure for overstatement; the 
upper error limit for overstatement (ignoring understatements) 
is reduced by the lower error limit for understatement (ignoring 
overstatements). A third possibility, of course, is to
net errors of overstatement and understatement found in the sample 
and evaluate the net result, but this possibility has little 
support in the literature.
Support for the DUS procedure is found in a series of tests 
performed by Teitlebaum (41). The three alternative procedures 
described above were applied to samples drawn from a series of 
populations, each with a known frequency of understatements and 
overstatements which netted to give exactly a material error 
rate. The tests were repeated for :
a) Various sample selection techniques
b) Various *t' values where t (tainting) = % 100,
a concept which allows MUS to deal with partial errors.
c) Va,rious gross error frequencies netting to exactly material 
error rates
d) Various confidence levels
e) Various sample sizes
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Since the frequences of understatements and overstatements in 
the population are known, the risk of a specified sample evalu­
ation procedure failing to detect the exactly material error 
rate can he calculated. This true risk is then compared with 
the stated risk of the evaluation procedure. The conclusion 
drawn from the tests was -
1. The H & 8 method is far too conservative, (i.e. true risks
are much less than the stated risks)
2. The DTJS method is appropriate hut minor safeguards may be
required, (in nearly all cases true risks were close to 
stated risks)
3. The method of netting error taintings and evaluating the 
net result is inappropriate at reasonable confidence levels 
(80 - 99%).
Hence, the H & S method, though its treatment of overstatement
is not inaccurate, is highly conservative, and since its
treatment of understatement is not conservative, the implication
is that the auditor is not as worried about understatements as
he is about overstatements. Conservatism in financial reporting
is no longer regarded by many people as desirable.
For instance, Hendriksen comments:
Conservatism is, at best, a very poor method of treating 
the existence of uncertainty in valuation and income.
At its worst, it results in a complete distortion of 
accounting data. ( 42)
On the basis of Teitlebaum*s study, the DUS procedure is to be
preferred to the other two possibilities considered*
The Error Limit Assumntion
The difference between the upper error limit and the most likely
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error is termed *precision*. Precision itself subdivides into 
basic precision (the precision which would be present even if 
there were no errors in the sample) and precision gap widening 
(the increase in precision caused by the discovery of errors in 
the sample). If there are no errors, precision gap widening is 
zero and precision equals basic precision. Precision gap 
widening relates to the errors found in the sample and its 
size is determined in part, by the size of the errors discovered. 
On the other hand, basic precision takes into account the fact 
that there may be errors in the population of a type (i.e. size) 
not discovered in the sample. Whether the evaluation concerns 
overstatement or understatement errors, some kind of assumption 
has to be made about the possible size of errors not discovered. 
Since the poisson factor for basic precision is normally given 
a lOO^ 'o tainting, the underlying assumption concerning errors not 
discovered in the sample is that they average IOO9L  For errors 
of overstatement, which in general have a maximum tainting of 
100^ ,^ this is a conservative assumption. For errors of under­
statement where there is no such theoretical maximum, the 
assumption could be false and lead to misleading results. In 
order to form a view as to the validity of this, or any alterna­
tive assumption concerning understatements, the auditor requires 
prior information (the sample errors found are no help since the 
assumption relates to errors not discovered in the sample)* 
However, it is difficult to be definite about what kind of prior 
information is most relevant. Certainly knowledge of the 
accounting system is likely to be of some assistance in this 
regard.
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Understatements and Prior Information : A Summary 
The discussion concerning the problem of evaluating under­
statements has revealed the following:
(1) the possibility of monetary unit sampling producing 
misleading results where the 100^  ^error limit assumption 
for understatements does not hold.
(2) the possibility, based on Teitlebaum*s results, that the 
H & 8 plan is inefficient in its treatment of overstate­
ments.
(3) the impossibility of structuring all audit tests so that 
they are tests for overstatement only. This is a result
of there being no reciprocal population given by the double 
entry matrix in four situations.
Wiere source documents are used there is the problem of 
non-monetary source documents.
The first of these requires knowledge of the possible size of 
understatements which exist, and in this connection knowledge 
of the accounting system may be relevant. The second does not 
concern prior knowledge since the suggestion is that DUS is 
preferable to the H & 8 plan in all circumstances. The third 
may involve prior knowledge of the system where source documents 
are used. What is clear, however, is that the availability of 
prior information makes relatively little impact on the problem 
of understatements and this problem remains a significant limi­
ting factor on the usefulness of all monetary unit sampling plans
INDETERMINATE RESULTS
In general, a sampling plan can be examined by reference to two 
risks 2
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risk - the risk that the sampling plan causes materially
correct financial statements to be rejected*
B  risk - the risk that the sampling plan causes materially
incorrect statements to be accepted.
The use of the alpha and beta risk concepts in a,n auditing context 
was first made by Elliott and Rogers (45).
The auditor should choose a sampling plan which controls not only 
the beta but also the alpha risk, and it follows that each 
sampling plan must incorporate 2 decision rules (one for 
acceptance and the other for rejection). If the sample result 
does not satisfy conditions for either acceptance or rejection, 
then the sample result is indeterminate and of little or no use 
to the auditor. To simplify the discussion it is assumed that 
only errors of overstatement are possible and ignores the problem 
of 'netting* overstatements and understatement, discussed in the 
preceding section.
Acceptance
It is easy to give a decision rule for acceptance of a reported 
population value: if the upper error limit is less than a 
material amount the reported value can be accepted. The risk of 
accepting a materially incorrect population (^ risk) cannot be 
greater than 1 - specified confidence level. It should be possible 
to persuade clients to alter the original reported value by the 
amount of errors discovered in the sample, and if this is done 
the acceptance rule can be modified to include oases where the 
upper error limit minus discovered errors is less than a material 
amount;
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accept when UEL - E ^ M
where UEL = npper error limit
E = actual discovered errors
M = material amount
Rejection
A decision rule for rejection can be formulated using the 
lower precision limit for the poisson distribution rather 
than the upper precision limit. The rejection rule is:
reject when LEL ^ M
where LEL = lower error limit
M = materiality
The risk of rejecting a materially correct population ( risk) 
is 1 - specified confidence level. In practice, rejection may 
mean a request to the client to 100% recheck the population, 
followed by a fresh sample of the revised population. If the 
client refuses to recheck, the auditor can consider a qualifi­
cation for the audit report.
Avoiding the Indeterminate Result
Kaplan (44) and Smith (45) have both suggested the same procedure 
for selecting a sample size which will not give an indeterminate 
result. It is necessary to distinguish the amount considered 
material for purposes of accepting a materially incorrect popu­
lation (M^) from that considered material for purposes of re­
jecting a materially correct population (Mjj) .
risk = risk of accepting a ma,terially incorrect 
population where true error ^
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dL risk
and
risk of rejecting a materially correct 
population where true error ^
Ma > %
The greater the divergence between and Mjj, the easier it is 
for a sample to distinguish between a materially correct and a 
materially incorrect population. However, and should be 
pre-set by the auditor independently of this consideration. The 
choice of and give an upper (Pa) and lower (Pr) limit for 
the permissible error rate and it is the size of Pa and Pr 
along with the size of the alpha and beta risk, also specified 
by the auditor, which determines sample size. As an example of 
the method consider the following;
Acceptable risk 
Acceptable ^  risk 
Reported population
Ma =
10?^
Im pounds
£20,000 (Pa = 0.02)
= £ 5,000 (Pr « 0.005)
Table 3 gives the poisson confidence factors (C) for a beta 
risk of 5%
Table 3_
K C
0 3.00
1 4* 74
2 6.50
3 7.75
4 9.15
5 10.5
^ = 0.05
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Beta risk is controlled by selecting sample size n such that 
n Pa ^  Cîk Eind if k or fewer errors are discovered, the popu­
lation is accepted# Table 4 gives the poisson confidence 
factors (c) for an alpha risk of 10%,
Table 4
K C
0 0.105
1 0.552
2 1.10
3 1.75
4 2.45
5 3.15
=  0,10
Alpha risk is controlled by selecting sample size n such that 
n pj* ^  Ck and if more than k errors are discovered the popu­
lation is rejected. It is necessary to choose values for n 
and k which satisfactorily control both the beta and alpha 
risks. This can be done by trial and error as follows:
Let k = 0
For beta risk n 0.02 ^
>
For alpha risk n 0.005 ^
n ^
These conditions are inconsistent.
Let k = 3
For beta risk n 0.02
n
For alpha risk n 0.005
n
Again, this is inconsistent.
>/
>
<
5
150
0.105
21
7.75
587
1.75 
350
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Let k = 4
For beta risk n 0,02 ^ 9.15
n >  457
For alpha risk n 0.005 ^  2.43
n ^  486
In order to control both alpha and beta risk at their required 
levels, the auditor must choose a sample size of 457 and accept 
if he discovers 4 or fewer errors, or reject if he finds more 
than 4 errors.
Two Stage Approach
It is clear from this example that the use of monetary unit 
sampling to control both the beta and alpha risks may require 
sample sizes which are in excess of those commonly used in 
auditing. In practice the auditor adopts a 2 stage approach;
1. An initial sample is selected to control the beta risk 
only.
2. In the event of an indeterminate result further audit work 
is performed on the basis of a study of the errors obtained 
in the sample.
An initial sample
Sample size is chosen on the basis of expected error rates and 
the required beta risk, (in the example, where ^  = 5%, &
sample size of 150 is required for an expected zero error rate, 
whereas a sample size of 387 is required for an expected error 
rate of 0,0077 (3/587)). If the error rate discovered in the 
sample does not exceed expectations, the auditor can accept the 
population as the beta risk requirement is satisfied. However,
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if the error rate in the sample exceeds expectations, the 
auditor has an indeterminate result since the alpha risk is 
not controlled and the population cannot, therefore, he re­
jected. An alternative to varying the initial sample size on 
the basis of the expected error rate is to select a discovery 
sample size, whatever the expected error rate. (This is the 
basis of the ÏÏ & S plan though not BUS). The auditor can then 
only accept populations where no errors are discovered in the 
sample, and the effect is to increase the incidence of inde­
terminate results, although there is, of course, the benefit of 
reduced samples.
Further audit work
Further audit work is required whenever indeterminate results 
are obtained. This work may be a general increase in sample 
size, but is more likely to be an increase in sample size in 
the particular area or areas suggested by a study of the errors. 
The auditor*s study will include consideration of whether;
(a) the error only recurs in a particular system,
(b) the error only recurs when the system is operated by a 
particular individual, or within a particular department 
or division,
(c) the error only recurs when a particular type of transaction, 
or input is processed.
(d) the error only recurs during a restricted time period.
Instead of trying to project the errors in the sample through­
out the population, the auditor attempts to place boundaries on 
the possible prevalence of the error and then evaluates the
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error within those boundaries. Evaluation of the error within
boundaries may require a further statistical sampling plan.
The case for the two stage approach has been well made by
Moriarity (46):
The auditor*8 objective in this random sample is to 
reduce to an acceptable level the probability of the 
existence of a material undiscovered type of error. If 
an unanticipated type of error is discovered, the auditor 
will not simply keep a tally of it, but rather will 
attempt to determine its cause and how it got through 
the system undetected. The auditor will determine if 
it is possible for a sufficient number of this type of 
error to exist and to total a material discrepancy. If 
it is possible for this type of error to have a material 
effect, the auditor will then design a specific sampling 
plan to search for more Instances of this type of error.
The auditor does not simply increase the number of 
random samples to be taken.
If the preceding is an accurate description of the auditor's 
reaction to the discovery of an error, it is not necessary 
for auditors to take sufficiently large random samples so 
that an estimate of the effect of all errors can be derived 
from the sample. Instead, the purpose of the sample should 
be to assure that at least one instance of every material 
type of error in the population occurs in the sample so 
that the auditor's attention will be directed to the 
problem area. This, of course, is discovery sampling.
These last comments have argued that statistical estimation 
should not be the objective when determining the extent of 
tests of details. However, the argument has not been made 
that estimation is never useful. Once the auditor has 
determined that a particular type of error exists in the 
client's population, he may well wish to design a sample 
of specific transactions to estimate the total effect of 
that type of error on the client's financial statements.
Adjustments
Where an Indeterminate result is obtained it may, in a few cases, 
be possible for the client and auditor to avoid further audit 
work by negotiating an adjustment to the population to a figure 
acceptable to both parties on the basis of the initial sample 
results. Of course since the alpha risk is not measured, the
15
adjustment may be taking place to a materially correct 
population. This is not a problem provided the population 
figure after adjustment is also materially correct. For an 
adjustment to be made, two conditions must be satisfied;
(1) The client must be willing to adjust.
Relatively few clients are willing to adjust to the MLE 
shown by the auditor's sample and from the client's point 
of view this is quite sensible since the accounts are his 
responsibility and he ought to have more confidence in the 
accounting system which has produced the figures than in 
the auditor's sample results. The instances where the 
client is willing to adjust are likely to be those where 
MLE (rather than the UEL) is itself higher than mater­
iality. Where the client is unwilling to adjust, the 
auditor has no grounds on which to reject the population 
and should perform further audit work.
(2) The auditor must be willing to adjust.
\\here the auditor finds a relatively large number of 
errors in the sample he is likely to be happier with an 
adjustment of the MLE (the best estimate of error in the 
population) than with an adjustment of UEL less Materiality. 
The latter adjustment would be quite different to the best 
estimate of error. However, even where the adjustment is 
based on the MLE the auditor may wish to be cautious. Fol­
lowing an adjustment of the MLB, the accounting figure is 
generated by the sample rather than by the accounting
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system, and high confidence in the sample results is a 
necessity. In addition, the auditor is much more likely 
to accept the adjustment of MLE when precision given by 
the sample results is less than materiality, and he is, 
therefore, more satisfied that the adjustment is to a 
materially correct figure. It should be remembered that 
"most likely*' does not say "how likely" and the most likely 
error rate, although the best available guess, may not meet 
such precision requirements (i.e. precision less than 
materiality). The identification of circumstances where 
both client and auditor are likely to be satisfied with an 
adjustment of MLE is made in Appendix 1.
For these reasons, adjustment is seen by this author as seldom 
being a practical alternative to further audit work at the stage 
of having completed the initial sample. It is much more likely 
to prove a possibility after further audit work has been com­
pleted and the auditor has more thorough evidence on the basis 
of which he can press for an adjustment.
Diagrammatic Summary of MUS decision rules
A diagrammatic summary of the decision rules discussed in this 
section is given in figure 3 • The decisions are as follows:
(l) If the auditor adopts the two stage approach, he starts 
with an initial sample and accepts the population if the 
decision rule for acceptance (UEL - E^M^) is satisfied. 
Since only the beta risk is controlled, any failure to 
satisfy this condition causes an indeterminate result.
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(2) Where an indeterminate result is obtained, the auditor is 
happy that the MLE gives a materially correct estimate, 
and the client is willing to adjust on that basis, the 
auditor should accept the adjusted figure.
(3) If the client is unwilling to adjust, the auditor studies 
the errors in the sample and decides whether further audit 
work should be general, or limited to specific areas.
(4) Having performed further audit work, the auditor assesses 
the results and decides whether he is now in a position to 
accept or reject the population,
(5) If the auditor rejects the population he may be satisfied 
with an adjusted figure, provided he has high confidence 
that the adjusted figure is materially correct.
(6) If a suitable adjustment cannot be negotiated and the client 
refuses to recheck the population himself, the auditor may 
be left with no alternative to a qualification in his audit 
report,
Meikle (47) in his comments on post evaluation states that the
auditor faced with unacceptable precision has four choices;
(a) Request the client to check the population 100%, and 
correct all errors located; then resample (RECHECK)
(b) Request an adjustment to the financial statements in an 
amount sufficient to reduce the adjusted precision to an 
acceptable level (ADJUSTMENT)
(c) Perform additional work as appropriate in the circumstances 
(FURTHER WORK)
(d) Consider the appropriateness of an unqualified opinion 
(QUALIFY)
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DIAGRAmATIG SUMîARY OF HITS DECISION RULES: 
FIGURE ^
TAKE INITIAL SAMPLE
YES NO
INDETERMINATE
RESULT
ACCEPT
POPN.
YES
ACCEPT
ADJUSTED
POPULATION
NO
YES NO
EXTEND 
AUDIT WORK 
IN SPECIFIC 
AREA(S)
EXTEND
SAMPLE
GENERALLY
NO
REJECT
YES NO
ACCEPT
ADJUSTED
POPULATION
YES NO
QUALIFYRESAMPLE REVISED
6. IS THE CLIENT WILLING 
TO RECHECK POPULATION?
2. ARE CONDITIONS FOR AN 
ADJUSTMENT TO THE POPN. 
SATISFIED?
1. IS SAMPLE RESULT SUCH 
THAT THE POPN. CAN BE 
ACCEPTED?
5, CAN POPULATION BE ADJUSTED TO A FIGURE 
ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH CLIENT AND AUDITOR?
4. DOES FURTHER AUDIT WORK INDICATE THAT 
POPN. CAN BE REJECTED?
5. DOES A STUDY OF THE ERRORS IN 
THE SAMPLE REVEAL THAT FURTHER 
AUDIT WORK MAY BE LIMITED IN SCOPE?
POPULATION
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Meikle does not, however, suggest a logical sequence to these 
options, which are seen in figure 3 as being;
ADJUST (on basis of initial sample)— > FURTHER WORK— ^ADJUST
(on basis of further work) RECHECK— ^QUALIFY.
The high error rate problem
It can be seen from the discussion in this section that there 
are two serious problems in using monetary unit sampling for 
populations with high error rates:
(1) If the auditor wishes to reject the population he needs to 
control the alpha risk, and this can only be done with 
large samples.
(2) If the auditor wishes to seek an adjustment on the basis
of the sample results he will, in many cases, have diffi­
culty in determining an adjustment which is acceptable to 
both the client and himself. (See appendix 1.)
For these reasons monetary unit sampling is of only limited 
assistance in sampling of high error rate populations and in 
such circumstances the auditor may prefer to use a variables 
technique. Variables techniques are discussed in the next 
chapter. Although they are often inappropriate for low error 
rate populations they frequently out-perform monetary unit 
sampling for high error rate populations. On the basis of his 
study of the errors found in an initial monetary unit sample, 
the auditor may, where the number of errors discovered is 
relatively large, wish to :
(1) perform further audit work in a specific area by conducting
a variables sample in that area
or
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(2) perform further audit work generally but to transfer to
a variables sampling plan, rather than extend the initial 
monetary unit sample.
In the second case it is clear that the auditor would have 
been advised to use a variables sampling plan from the outset 
had he examined the systems of internal accounting control and 
the examination indicate the likelihood of high error rates. A 
study of the system can be useful in determining the circum­
stances in which a monetary unit or variables sampling plan is 
the appropriate technique*
Even in the first case a study of the systems might be preferred 
to an initial monetary sample as the preliminary survey which 
directs the auditor's attention to the high error risk area. 
Indeterminate results and the need for -prior information 
The discussion concbrning the problem of indeterminate results 
has revealed the following:
(1) Because of the difficulties involved in either rejecting 
a population or making an adjustment to a population on 
the basis of the sample result, monetary unit sampling is 
generally unsuited to high error rate populations. A prior 
study of the accounting system is valuable in so far as it 
enables the auditor to determine in advance the likelihood 
of high error rates and hence avoid the inefficiency of 
having to switch midstream from an MUS to a variables plan.
(2) Because of the large sample sizes required to control the 
alpha risk, the efficient use of monetary unit sampling 
generally involves an initial sample (which controls only 
the beta risk) followed by appropriate further audit work
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where necessary. This further audit work includes, among 
other matters, consideration of whether:
a) the error only recurs in a particular system
b) the error only recurs when the system is operated 
by a particular individual
c) the error only recurs when a particular type of 
transaction is processed.
The three considerations require prior knowledge of system 
boundaries (case a), the personnel operating the system 
(case b) and the types of data processed (case c).
ERROR PRONE AREAS
Monetary unit sampling has been criticised for not allowing the 
auditor to give more weight to those areas where the risk of 
error is highest. For example, Smith comments that "the 
advocates of CMA sampling proclaim its advantages too loudly"(48) 
since it "does not make explicit use of any knowledge about key 
areas that might be error prone" (49) and Goodfellow, Loebbecke 
and Neter (50) argue in their criticism of monetary unit sampling 
that since large audit units have a greater chance of selection 
than small units, MUS cannot be the most effective sample design 
if most of the errors are in the small items* Monetary
unit sampling can be shown to be equivalent to upper boundary 
priced physical unit sampling with an infinite degree of strati­
fication and, therefore, automatically stratifies the popu­
lation by value, but not by error risks (5l)*
The discussion which follows investigates this criticism of 
monetary unit sampling and finds the criticism valid in the 
sense that the efficiency of MUS may be improved if the error
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prone section of the population is separately identified and 
given separate consideration in the sample. In this dis­
cussion the process of splitting the population into two 
sections according to risk characteristics is termed 
"segmentation", and the ratio of the population in one segment 
to the population in the other is termed "the segmentation 
ratio". The term is also used in this way by Kinney (52),
If the population can be divided into two sections or segments 
(one error prone and the other not) there are two ways in which 
this tfeire- could be given consideration in the monetary sample:
(a) total sample size is allocated between segments propor­
tionately according to the number of population units in
each, and separate random samples are selected.
(strategy 2)
(b) total sample size is allocated between segments according 
to their risk characteristics. A proportionately larger 
sample is allocated to the higher risk segment and separate 
random samples are selected, (strategy 3)
Strategy 2 may be thought of as a "passive" and strategy 5 as an 
"active" strategy. To demonstrate the validity of the criticism 
of MUS, both the passive and active strategies are compared with 
a conventional monetary unit sample of the same size. Neither 
DUS nor the H & 8 plan give special consideration to error prone
sections of the population: the sample is one unrestricted
sample from the entire population and this may be thought of as 
a "conventional" strategy (strategy l). It is assumed that 
whichever strategy is employed, the sample is to serve as an
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initial discovery sample as outlined in the previous section on 
"indeterminate results", A oomparisoin between the efficiency of 
the strategies (conventional, active and passive) can therefore 
be made on the basis of the probability of each strategy failing 
to detect a single error, given that there is material error in 
the population. For each strategy the demonstration assumes a 
sample size of 100 and a population with the characteristics 
given in figure 4 . For a more rigorous demonstration the 
process of comparison can be repeated using different sample 
sizes and population characteristics. The effect of varying 
the segmentation ratio is studied later in this section but the 
effect of varying any of the other characteristics is not re­
ported, The study of segmentation is simply to provide a de­
monstration of how it can improve the efficiency of MUS, A 
fuller examination of the issue is given elsewhere by this 
author (53)*
Figure 4 : Population characteristics
1, Population size 10^
2, Population error rate 0,02
3, Segmentation of the population 
into two segments is possible -
Segment 1 = 0,1 x 10^
Segment 2 = 0,9 x 10^
The actual distribution of the error of £2,000 in the popu­
lation is varied between three positions -
1. Spread; in this case the error is spread evenly across the
population and each pound, no matter where it is located.
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has approximately an equal chance of being in error.
2. Load in segment 1; the error is loaded into segment 1
and all pounds outwith segment 1 are error free.
3. Load in segment 2; the error is loaded into segment 2
and all pounds outwith segment 2 are error free.
No matter how the error is actually distributed, the auditor's 
prior assessment is assumed to be that segment 1 is error prone. 
One possible version of the active strategy is, therefore, to 
allocate 20 sample pounds to segment 1 and 80 to segment 2.
This is the version at first used in the demonstration, al­
though it is later varied.
Results; a comparison of the strategies
The resultant probabilities of failure to detect a single error, 
for the given audit strategy/error distributions a,re as per 
table 5 .
ERROR
DISTRIBUTION
1
STRATEGY
2 3
SPREAD 0.1326 0.1326 0.1326
LOAD IN 
SEGMENT 1 0.1326 0.1073 0.0115
LOAD IN 
SEGMENT 2 0.1326 0.1323 0.1656
TABLE 5
NOTE STRATEGY 1 = 
STRATEGY 2 = 
STRATEGY 3 =
CONVENTIONAL
PASSIVE
ACTIVE
The workings to support the figures in these and other tables 
provided in this section are given in the second appendix to
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this chapter. The results demonstrate that, given spread, 
there is nothing to choose between the three strategies. Given 
load in segment 1, judged to be the "high risk" segment, 
strategy 1 is inferior to strategy 2, (0,1326 to 0,1073) which 
in turn is markedly Inferior to strategy 3 (0,1073 to 0.QII5),
If, however, the prior assessment of segment 1 as being the 
high risk segment is completely wrong, and the load is, in fact, 
in segment 2, then strategy 1 is only marginally inferior to 
strategy 2 (0,1326 to 0.1323), which is in turn superior to 
strategy 5 (O.I323 to 0,1656). It follows that strategy 1 is 
either equivalent to, inferior to or marginally inferior to 
strategy 2, and can be discarded in favour of strategy 2 in all 
circumstances, assuming the costs of segmentation are not a 
material factor. A choice between strategies 2 and 3 depends 
upon the confidence the auditor can attach to his assessment of 
segment 1 as the high risk area. If he is confident of his 
assessment strategy 3 is likely to be preferred.
A study of the passive strategy (strategy 2)
In the illustration the population has been split into segments 
in the ratio 0.1 : 0,9. This section studies the effect on 
strategy 2 of a variation in this segmentation ratio. Table 6 
provides the probability of failing to detect a single error, 
given strategy 2 (the sample is allocated proportionately to 
segment size) for segmentation ratios O.3 : 0,7 and 0,5 ; O.5 
in addition to the ratio 0.1 : 0.9.
As segment sizes approach equality (0.5 : O.5) strategy 2 becomes 
less effective in circumstances where the error is loaded in
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segment 1 (0,1073 to 0.1262 to 0.1298), but marginally more 
effective should the error be loaded in segment 2 (0,1323 to 
0,1314 to 0.1298). In spite of this compensating effect it is 
likely that strategy 2 will be regarded as becoming less 
effective as the segment sizes equalise. It is however, in 
all cases preferable to strategy 1.
SEGMENTATION
RATIO
STRATEGY 1 STRATEGY 2
LOAD LOAD 
SEGMENT 1 SEGMENT 2
0.1 : 0,9 0,1526 0.1073 0.1323
0,3 : 0,7 0.1326 0.1262 0.1314
0.5 : 0.5 0.1326 0.1298 0.1298
TABLE 6 NOTE STRATEGY 1 = CONVENTIONAL STRATEGY 2 = PASSIVE
A study of the active strategy (strategy 5)
The version of strategy 3 nsed in the illustration was to 
allocate 20 items to segment 1, the high risk area, and 80 
items to segment 2. This section studies the effect on strategy 
3 of varying this disproportionate allocation. Table 7 provides 
the probability of failing to detect a single error, assuming 
an allocation of 16, 32 and 64 items to segment 1 as alternatives 
to the allocation of 20 items. The segmentation ratio is
0.1 ; 0,9 throughout.
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ALLOCATION 
TO SEGMENT 1
STRATEGY 5
LOAD LOAD
SEGMENT 1 SEGMENT 2
STRATEGY 2 (lO) 0.1073 0.1323
16 0.0281 0,1514
20 0.0115 0.1656
52 0.0008 0.2169
64 APPROACHING
ZERO
0.4453
TABLE 7 NOTE STRATEGY 3 = ACTIVESTRATEGY 2 = PASSIVE
The results show that a comparatively small bias toward segment 1 
(eg an allocation of 16 rather than lO) causes a very marked 
improvement (0,1073 to 0.0281), provided segment 1 is error 
loaded. A large bias toward segment 1 (eg an allocation of 32) 
causes a marked deterioration (0.1323 to 0.2169) in the effect­
iveness of strategy 3 should segment 2 be error loaded. It is 
likely, therefore, that a relatively small bias toward the an­
ticipated high risk area is to be preferred to either no bias 
(strategy 2) or to a large bias.
Error prone areas and the need for prior information 
The calculated results demonstrate that segmentation can in­
crease the efficiency of MUS and that its usefulness can be 
improved by giving the allocation of the sample a relatively 
small bias toward the anticipated high risk segment , In order 
to be able to adopt the passive strategy the auditor must be able 
to segment the population according to risk characteristics, 
but he does not need to assess the risks involved, other
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than to realise that they are different* A major cause of 
risk differential is that items passing through different 
internal control systems have come together in one account, 
or are treated as one population for monetary unit sampling 
purposes. Monetary unit sampling is increasingly used to sample 
"global” populations. In this case several different accounts' 
figures are added together and treated as a single population 
of pounds for monetary unit sampling purposes (eg the whole of 
the assets side of the balance sheet may be regarded as one 
population). This practice increases the importance of seg­
mentation. In such circumstances, segmentation is likely to 
follow systems' boundaries and prior knowledge of these boun­
daries is essential. It may also require knowledge of the 
different personnel operating the system and the different 
transactions processed by the system since these factors can 
also cause risk differential. It should be noted that when the 
auditor does not segment his initial sample and does not achieve 
an acceptable sample result, he effectively "post-segments" his 
population through a study of the errors discovered in the 
sample. (Figure 2 — decision 3). The argument here is in
favour of "pre-segmentation" of the initial sample, which may 
later require revision as a result of a study of the errors 
found.
In order to be able to adopt the active strategy the auditor 
must attempt to assess the risks of error in the different seg­
ments. The more confident he is of his assessment, the more he
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may be prepared to bias the sample toward the high risk segments* 
Clearly such an assessment requires a thorough examination of the 
system of internal accounting control.
MONETARY UNIT SAMPLING AND THE SECOND PROPOSITION OF THE 
CHAPTER
The chapter considers three major problems in the application of 
monetary unit sampling* They are - 
1 * treatment of understatements
2. frequency of indeterminate results
5* lack of consideration of error prone areas.
For each heading, the chapter investigates the problem and 
identifies prior information which may be helpful. The results 
of the investigation are summarised in table 8 . It is clear 
from this table that the auditor who, for monetary unit sampling, 
wishes to structure his audit tests (lA), who wishes to avoid 
misleading results (5A) and who wishes to employ the technique 
efficiently (2A, 2D, 3®) needs prior information of the account­
ing system, ranging from mere knowledge of the documents and 
document flow (lA) through to a full assessment of the system 
(5A, 3B) including an evaluation of the risk of error.
The second proposition of the chapter states :
The chances of making the nrouer selection of statistical 
samulinff plan imurove as a result of examination of the 
accounting system and its internal controls.
The following reasons have been identified as to why it is 
desirable to carry out an examination of the system prior to 
performance of monetary unit sampling:
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1) to recognise appropriate "reciprocal" populations.
2) as a basis for an assumption about the maximum size of
understatement errors not found in the sample,
3) to avoid using monetary unit sampling when error rates
are high.
4) to enable "post segmentation" when errors are discovered 
in a monetary unit sample.
5) to enable the auditor to "pre-segment" the population*
TABLE 8
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE 
OF THE SYSTEM
1 *
2.
Documents and document 
flow*
Knowledge of systems 
boundaries, operating 
personnel, transactions 
processed.
A full assessment of the 
system(s) including 
evaluation of the risk 
of error.
PROBLEM FOR WHICH REQUIRED
A, Understatements - the iden­
tification of source docu­
ments suitable as a 
"reciprocal" population. 
Helps to determine the 
structure of the audit test.
A. Indeterminate results - 
essential for a proper study 
of errors found in the 
sample when the two stage 
approach is employed. The 
two stage approach reduces 
the inefficiency of MUS 
caused by the lack of con­
trol of the alpha risk.
B. Error prone areas - 
essential to the adoption 
of the passive strategy 
where segmentation is em­
ployed. Segmentation may 
reduce the inefficiency of 
MUS caused by failure to 
consider error prone areas.
A, Understatements - impor­
tant for a consideration 
of the error limit assumpt­
ion applied to understate­
ments. If the assumption 
is invalid MUS may give 
misleading results.
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3. Continued .•. B. Error -prone areas - 
essential to the adoption 
of the active strategy 
where segmentation is 
employed. The active 
strategy can lead to 
greater efficiency than 
the passive strategy pro­
vided the auditor is con­
fident of his prior risk 
assessment,
C. Indeterminate Results - 
high error rates will 
lead to indeterminate 
results and inefficiency.
MONETARY UNIT SAMPLING AND THE FIRST PROPOSITION OF THE 
CHAPTER
Understatements
As far as the treatment of understatements is concerned, the 
prior information available makes little impact in circum­
stances where it is not possible to structure the audit tests 
so that they are tests for overstatement only. In these cir­
cumstances the auditor is forced to make an error limit 
assumption for understatement and a study of the system 
generally gives inadequate guidance as to the possible size, 
as opposed to frequency, of errors.
Indeterminate results
Monetary unit sampling is shown to be generally inappropriate 
for populations with high error rates, for the following 
reasons;
l) If the auditor wishes to reject the population, he needs 
to control the alpha risk and this can only be done with 
large samples.
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2) If the auditor wishes to seek an adjustment on the basis 
of the sample results he will, in many eases, have 
difficulty in determining an adjustment which is accept­
able to both the client and himself.
Although prior information in the form of systems evaluation 
is valuable in detecting possible high error rate populations, 
such prior information is essentially negative in character 
and monetary unit sampling's inappropriateness for such popu­
lations remains a significant limitation on its usefulness.
Error -prone areas
It is shown that monetary unit sampling is more efficient when 
it takes account of error prone areas through segmentation of 
the population. Prior knowledge is required to enable efficient 
segmentation but such prior knowledge is essentially positive 
in character. It is not considered that a failure to consider 
error prone areas represents an inevitable limitation on the 
usefulness of monetary unit sampling plans which will ultimately 
be developed to incorporate prior knowledge of error prone 
areas in the evaluation.
The first proposition of the chapter is stated as follows:
There is no single choice of statistical sampling plan which 
is a-puropriate in all circumstances.
This chapter has established that there are circumstances in 
which monetary unit sampling plans, at least, are inappropriate.
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APPENDIX 1
Negotiation of an adjustment on the 'basis of the MLE 
The following table is taken from the table of cumulative 
precision factors employed by Arthur Young McClelland Moores 
& Co and is based on the poisson distribution.
For 9596 Confidence Level
ER MLB BP PGW UEL
0 0 5 N/A 3
1 1 3 0.75 4.75
2 2 5 1.30 6.50
3 3 5 1.76 7,76
4 4 5 2.16 9.16
5 5 5 2.52 10.52
6 6 5 2,85 11.85
7 7 5 3.15 13.15
8 8 5 3.44 14.44
9 9 5 3.71 15.71
10 10 5 3.97 16.97
ER = error rate in sample
MLE = most likely error in population
BP = basic precision
PGW » precision gap widening
UEL = upper error limit (MLE + BP + PGW)
1. It was suggested in the main body of the chapter that
the client is likely to be willing to adjust whenever 
MLE exceeds materiality, ie when MLE ^  M
2. It was also suggested that the auditor is likely to allow
an adjustment of MLE whenever precision is less than 
materiality, ie when M (P = BP + PGW)
3. Both these conditions are satisfied when
P < M < MLB
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The conditions can be studied by slightly rewriting 
the table (at 95% confidence).
ER P MLB MLE - P
0 3 0 -3
1 3.75 1 -2.75
2 4.30 2 -2.50
3 4.76 3 -1.76
4 5.16 4 -1.16
5 5.52 5 -0.52
6 5.85 6 +0.15
7 6.15 7 +0.85
8 6.44 8 +1.56
9 6.71 9 +2.29
10 6.97 10 +3.05
5.
6 .
7.
8.
9.
The conditions are impossible to satisfy at error rates 
of 5 or lower since P ^  MLE
The conditions may possibly be satisfied when ER = 6, 
although M must lie in a very narrow range between 
5.85 and 6 (O.15).
The range increases as ER increases and satisfaction of 
the conditions becomes rather more likely, although the 
conditions remain highly restrictive.
It is concluded that a negotiated adjustment based on the 
MLE is only possible in a limited number of cases.
Even these limited number of cases ignore possible 
constraints imposed by the LEL.
95.-
APPENDIX 2; WORKINGS TO SUPPORT SEGMENTATION STATISTICS 
STRATEGY 1
probability of the first sample item being correct
=  0.98
probability of first and second sample items being correct
= 0.98^
probability of 100 sample items all being correct
= (0.98)100 = 0.1526
STRATEGY 2
In general,
E = population size 
Kn ~ size of segment into which error loaded 
n = sample size 
Kn = segment sample size 
p = population error rate
then error rate in the segment is
KE K
and probability of failing to detect a single error in a
segment sample size of Kn = (l-jp)^ ^
K
K = 0.1, p ~ 0.02, n =3 100
(1 - 0.02)10 = 0.1073
0,1
K = 0.5
rr~" 0.02)^0 = 0.1262
0.3
(1 - 0.02)2^ = 0.1298
0.5
^ (1 - 0.02)70 = 0.1514
0.7
K,., = Of.2
(1 - 0,02)%u » 0,1525
0.9
K = 1.0
("1^  0.02)100 = 0.1526
1
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STRATEGY 3 
In general,
E = population size 
KH =s size of segment into which error loaded 
n = sample size 
8 =3 segment sample size
P = population error rate
then error rate in the segment is 2
K
and probability of failing to detect a single error in a 
se ent sample size of 8 w (l-jo)s
K
s K = 0.1. T> = 0.02
(1 “ 0.02)1^
0.1
0.0281
s = 20, K = 0.1
(1 - 0.02)20
0.1
0.0115
8 32. K » 0.1
(1 - 0.02)52 = 
0.1
0.0007922
8 64, K = 0.1
(1 - 0.02)64
0.1
0.0000006
8 = 8_4_, K = 0.9. V - 0.02
(1 - 0.02)84 = 0.1514
0.09
s = 80. K = 0.9
(1 - 0.02)80
0.9
0.1656
8 ” 68. K = 0.9
(1 - 0.02)68
0.9
0.2169
s = 36, K = 0.9
(1 - 0.02)56
0.9
0.4455
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CHAPTER 4
VARIABLES SAMPLING AED PRIOR INPORMATIOM
The previous chapter studied the following two propositions 
in relation to monetary unit sampling;
1. There is no single choice of statistical sampling 
technique which is appropriate in all circumstances
and
2. The chances of making the proper selection of statistical 
sampling technique improve as a result of examination of 
the accounting system and its internal controls.
This chapter extends the study of these two propositions to 
the use of variables sampling techniques.
The possibility of the accountant or auditor using variables 
sampling became widely recognised in the early 1960's follow­
ing publications by Arkin, and by Cyert and Davidson (54).
The statistical formulae of the various variables techniques 
can be found in either of these texts. The techniques differ 
from monetary unit sampling plans in that they are based on 
normal distribution theory rather than the poisson distri­
bution. However, Goodfellow, Loebbecke and Neter ( 55) have 
referred to monetary unit sampling as combined attributes and 
variables sampling (CAV) in spite of the fact that MUS has no 
connection with the normal distribution. It is also the case 
that monetary unit sampling has been developed much more re­
cently, and in certain respects is specifically designed to 
cater for the auditor's requirements, whereas variables sampling
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techniques have been widely used for estimation purposes for 
many years in all kinds of disciplines.
This chapter reviews several well known articles which examine 
or question the effectiveness of variables sampling plans and, 
on the basis of this review, points to the limitations of such 
plans and to the prior information which may be useful. The 
articles fall into three groups -
1. those concerned with the beta risk implicit in variables 
sampling plans.
Elliott and Rogers (56) demonstrate that decision rules 
frequently employed by auditors on a rule of thumb basis 
actually have alarmingly high beta risks. They argue 
that the auditor should explicitly control the beta risk 
of the variables sampling plan and suggest a decision 
strategy to achieve their objective. Clearly, 'rule
of thumb* decision rules may cause the auditor to take 
incorrect decisions. Teitlebaum and Robinson (5?) are 
concerned that the difference between real and nominal 
beta risk for variables sampling plans may vary according 
to both the distribution of error through the population 
and the total amount of error in the population. Again, 
this may cause the auditor to take incorrect decisions.
2. those concerned with empirical testing of variables 
sampling plans against known accounting populations.
By testing a sampling plan repeatedly against known 
accounting populations, the true (or real) risk of apply­
ing the technique (as approximated by the empirical
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results) can be compared with the stated (or nominal) 
risk given by the theory. Thus the researcher can ex­
amine the likelihood of inaccurate or misleading results 
(i.e. to what extent real risk y nominal risk) and 
inefficiency (real risk ^  nominal risk). Inefficiency 
can also be examined by studying the size of the standard 
error of the estimator provided by the sample plan.
Kaplan (58) has examined variables techniques by reference 
to populations generated by known stochastic processes 
whereas Neter and Loebbecke (59) use populations derived 
from actual accounting populations.
5. those concerned with sampling objectives.
Ijiri and Kaplan (60) have argued that the observable 
behaviour of auditors, when for instance selecting a 
judgement sample, is not to seek solely a representative 
sample but also to seek a sample which includes errors 
and high value items. They criticise sampling plans em­
ployed by auditors for concentrating on 'representation* 
at the expense of error prone and high value items.
Insofar as Ijiri and Kaplan's criticism concerns a failure 
to bias sample selection toward error prone items, then it 
is also relevant as a criticism of monetary unit sampling. 
Kinney (61), however, points out that sophisticated sam­
pling plans do bias sample selection toward error prone 
and high value items in a way consistent with the auditor's 
overall risk and materiality requirements. Kinney demon­
strates his point by using a variables sampling plan with
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the population stratified in two dimensions (size and 
likely error rate). For this reason the discussion of 
sampling objectives is included in this (variables 
sampling) chapter, Kinney could equally well demonstrate 
his point by using a monetary sampling plan with the 
population segmented according to likely error rate.
FLLIQTT AND ROGERS
A typical 'rule of thumb* decision rule employed by auditors 
using variables techniques might be;
1, Let precision (p) equal materiality (m ),
2. Let the confidence level (CL) vary according to the 
assessment of internal control (e,g. for poor and 
80% for excellent control),
5, Calculate the statistical confidence interval,
4* If it includes the book value accept the book value as
being correct, otherwise reject the book value,
Elliott and Rogers (62) report that many auditors use such 
decision rules which, although they give an alpha risk of 5% 
(20% for excellent internal control) give a beta risk of around 
50% no matter what the condition of internal control. The risk 
associated with such a decision rule can be demonstrated as 
follows; ^(0
risk Distribution 
of Sample 
Means Assuming 
reported Value 
(r ) is correct
R R+P
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If the re-ported value (r ) is correct, the chance of a sample 
mean lying ontslde the range (R«P) to (R+P) is 1 - C*L*
Hence the chance of a correct reported value lying outside 
the statistical confidence interval is 1 - C.L. The alpha 
risk is 1 - G*L.
&  risk
p(s)
R-P
Distribution 
of Sample 
Means Assuming 
Reported Value 
is Incorrect 
by a Material 
Amount
If the reported value is materially incorrect, the chance of a 
sample mean lying inside the range (R-P) to (R+P) equals 0.5 
when confidence levels over 80% are used. For example, if a 
confidence level of 95% is used, P = 1.96 standard deviations, 
2P = 5,92 standard deviations and beta = 50%. In most circum­
stances, therefore, beta risk is 50%. This is unsatisfactory 
on two counts:
1. it is far too high
2. it does not vary v/ith the confidence level used and
adjusting the confidence level is the normal mechanism 
for allowing for internal control.
An effective decision strategy
A far better approach is to use a precision which is less than
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the amount considered material. Elliott and Rogers suggest 
the following decision rule:
1. Let P = M/(l + Z^/Z^)
2.
Where Zx is the normal table value which 
includes an area 0.5 - x.
Accept the reported value if it is included 
in the statistical confidence interval but 
otherwise reject.
The derivation of this decision rule is as follows: 
çL risk
Distribution 
of Sample 
Means Assuming 
Reported Value 
is Correct
R-P R R+P
As before, the alpha risk is 1 - C.L. 
risk ^
X S.D. = P 
p(s) S.D. =
Distribution 
of Sample 
Means Assuming 
Reported Value 
is Incorrect by 
a Material 
Amount
R-M R-P R+P
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The chance of a sample mean falling Inside the range 
(R-P) to (R+P) is ^
where Z (R-P) - (R-M) 
S.D*
(l=£)
p ^  
(M-P) ^
z ^
p =
Re.iection
If application of the decision rules leads to the 'reject* 
decision the auditor may decide that an adjustment would be 
acceptable to him. The best estimate of the correct value 
is the point estimate. However, in many cases the auditor 
can accept a figure between the point estimate and the re­
ported value. Suppose the auditor wishes to be 95% confident 
that the account balance is materially correct. The auditor 
can accept the figure A as shovm in the graph.
Confidence 
that Account 
Balance is 
Materially 
Correct
Point
Estimate
Reported
Value
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If the original is less than 0.05 and/or the original ^  
is less than 0.50, there will be a range of values all of 
which have at least a 95% confidence of being materially 
correct (65)* Bearing in mind Bayesian statistics, the most 
logical choice from this range of values is A.
The need for computerisation
There are three reasons why Elliott and Roger's approach is 
only feasible when computerised.
1. Sample size is calculated on the basis of an expected 
population variability. Whenever the population varia­
bility, as estimated from the sample results, differs 
from that expected, it is necessary to adjust one or more 
parameters or to increase sample size. The 
necessary adjustments can only be easily computed by 
computer.
2. In order to keep oC , and sample size to satisfactory 
levels, stratification is desirable. Again, this can 
only easily be done by computer.
3. Experience with manual applications suggests that non­
sampling errors are frequent. Non-sampling errors can be 
reduced by computerisation.
To summarise, Elliott and Rogers* decision strategy is as 
follows:
1* Choose the desired confidence level (C.L. %) so that
(100 - C.L.)% corresponds to the alpha risk;
2. Choose the appropriate precision P in relation to
materiality M so as to achieve the desired beta risk.
(P = M, )
H.
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3* Use the decision rule : if the statistical confidence 
interval Includes the reported value, accept; if the 
statistical confidence interval does not include the 
reported value, reject.
TEITLEBAUM AND ROBINSON
Teitlebaum and Robinson consider the beta risk for any par­
ticular sampling plan at three levels;
Level 1
Given a population with a particular total error (u) provided 
by a particular pattern of errors, the first level of beta 
risk is the probability that a sample does not provide
a maximum potential error in excess of the actual error (u)•
Level 2
The second level is more general since the ^   ^risks are con­
sidered for all possible patterns of errors in the population 
which total u or more. The second level of beta risk 
is the largest value of all these ^  ^  risks.
Level 3
The third level is still more general since ^  risks are 
considered for all possible values of u, the actual total error 
in the population. The third and most general level of beta 
risk 111) ie the largest of all the ^  risks.
is the beta risk associated with the use of a sampling 
plan; ^ is the beta risk associated with the particular audit 
application of the sampling plan where u is equal to materiality. 
^  ^  is the beta risk associated with the particular audit appli­
cation to a population with a particular pattern of errors. It
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should he noted that ^  is the beta risk described in the 
previous section. However, the 'true* beta risk of a sampling 
plan may be regarded as P  This is the maximum chance of
stating an upper error limit of less than the true actual 
error value present in the population, however the errors mi^ht 
be distributed in that population and whatever their total 
value. Since ^  is the largest of all ^  and P  H  the 
largest of all ^  ^it follows that ^ ^ ^  11 ^  ^  1 if
a population can be found with a particular pattern of errors 
and a particular total error (u) which provides a beta risk
1) which is greater than the stated (nominal) beta risk of 
the sampling plan, it follows that the true beta risk {P 111) 
must also be greater than the stated risk, and the plan is in­
valid for general application. Teitlebaum and Robinson provide
such populations to demonstrate the invalidity for general use 
of stratified sampling and ratio estimation techniques.
In tabl%'9 the population is divided into fifteen strata and
stratified sampling suggests the auditor can be 95% confident
that the maximum potential overstatement is ^6800. (materiality).
Stratum four comprises 1296 items around a class mark of |!26-25*
If stratum four is seeded with - 259 fictitious
items the auditor will fail to detect a fictitious item in his
stratum sample of 6 items in aboutf 1 - 259 = 26% of the
\ 1296 /
time. Hence, a population can be found with a particular 
pattern of errors and a particular total error (^6800 =
materiality) such that the beta risk (^ 1) of stratified 
sampling is in excess of the stated risk (5% in this example).
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The true beta risk ( ^  m )  must, therefore, be in excess of 
the stated risk and stratified sampling may be invalidated 
for general use.
Stratum No Item count Value :range (gf) Sample Size
1 1,219 0 — 10.50 6
2 1,699 10.50 - 16.50 6
5 1,576 16.50 - 22.50 6
4 1,296 22.50 - 30.00 6
5 923 30.00 43.50 8
6 500 43.50 - 63.00 6
7 348 63.00 - 90.00 6
8 294 90.00 - 135.00 8
9 187 135.00 - 195.00 7
10 103 195.00 - 285.00 5
11 68 285.00 — 435.00 6
12 44 435.00 — 675.00 7
13 24 675.00 - 945.00 4
14 16 945.00 - 1,545.00 7
15 12 1,545.00 - 6,945.00 12
8,509 100
Total value /379,151
TABLE 9 
KAPLAN
Kaplan considers a class of auxiliary information estimators 
which are all described by the following general formulas
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A
Y = y + z (x - x)
where Y = mean true value of population
y = mean true value of sampled items
X = mean recorded value of population
X = mean recorded value of sampled items
z = either a constant or a function of the
sample values
For example, direct extension is described by the general
A
formula when Z = 0, (i.e. Y = y). The mean true value
of sampled items is taken as the estimate of the mean true
value of the population. Differences sampling is derived from
A
the general formula by setting Z = 1. (i.e. Y = x +
(ÿ - x)). The estimate is the mean recorded value adjusted by
the difference between the mean true value and mean recorded
value of sample items* The standard ratio estimator is derived
A
by setting Z » “ r (i.e. Y = rx). Thus, the estimate
is the ratio (r) applied to the mean recorded value of the 
population. Since Z is computed from sample data, the ratio 
estimator is biased.
For the class of auxiliary information estimators considered by 
Kaplan, an estimator of the variance of the mean estimate is 
given by -
sS = 1 - f
Y n
where N = number of items in population
109 -
n “ number of items in sample 
f = ^/N, the sampling fraction
n - 1
^ (yj - - 2Z è (yj - y) (xj - x)
1 1
The simulation experiments were performed using populations 
generated by known stochastic processes in order to test 
members of the class of auxiliary information estimators. His 
results are summarised as follows:
1. As expected, the estimator provided by direct extension 
(unstratified) had a far higher variance than those pro­
vided by differences sampling or ratio estimation.
2. No problem appeared with the bias of the ratio estimator. 
Its results, even for small samples, were virtually 
identical to those of the unbiased differences sampling 
estimator.
3. For differences sampling and ratio estimators, when the 
estimate of the true value was close to the book value, 
(i.e. there were few errors in the population) the standard 
deviation of the estimate was unusually low, and the re­
sults given by differences sampling were, as a result, 
misleading. Differences sampling and ratio estimates give 
misleading results when errors are infrequent, especially 
when errors are large and infrequent. These techniques 
should only be used when a 'qualifying* number of errors 
exist in the population. The problem is caused by the 
correlation between the sample mean and standard deviation.
- 110 -'
In the extreme case no errors in the sample gives a 
standard deviation of zero and the result given by dif­
ferences sampling is that the auditor can be certain 
there are no errors in the population, (clearly this 
is a false result). It follows that implanting trivial 
errors into an error free population does not help, since 
the estimate of the true value remains close to the book 
value.
Anderson and Leslie also comment on the unsuitability of im­
planting trivial errors.
.... an auditor might be tempted to inject artificial 
errors into the population in an attempt to create the 
high population frequency in which he knows difference 
estimation is more reliable. Yet a moment's reflection 
indicates that it would be absurd to think that injecting 
artificial errors (and then reconciling them out at the 
end) could somehow cure the initial problem any more than 
one can lift oneself up by one's own bootstraps (64).
Kaplan concludes, that direct extension, differences sampling 
and ratio estimation are all unsuited to the special require­
ments of the audit situation:
The basic problem is that classical techniques described 
in this paper are designed for a homogeneous population. 
But an auditing population is actually a mixture of two 
quite different populations ; one consists of a large 
number of correct items; the other is the much smaller 
population of items in error. Techniques, such as those 
presented in this paper, which do not explicitly recognise 
these fundamentally different populations seem inadequate 
for auditing applications. (65)
NETER AND LOEBBECKE
Neter and Loebbecke have empirically tested a series of 
statistical estimators against a variety of created accounting 
populations. The estimators selected include direct extension
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(mean per unit), auxiliary estimators such as differences and 
ratio estimator, stratified mean per unit and dollar unit 
sampling* Unfortunately, Neter and Loebbecke chose to test 
a particularly conservative version of dollar unit sampling 
and their empirical testing of that technique does not, 
therefore, allow a judgement of the dollar unit sampling 
plan of Teitlebaum (or, indeed of the Haskins and Sells plan) 
discussed in the previous chapter. Neter and Loebbecke them­
selves state in the conclusion to their study that there is 
a need to examine dollar unit sampling estimators which 
employ less conservative methods. Their results confirm a 
number of observations already made in this chapter. For 
instance
(1) direct extension is highly imprecise.
(2) direct extension can be unreliable where populations 
are moderately skewed.
(3) the bias of the ratio estimator is negligible.
(4) the reliability of the difference and ratio estimator 
is low when the error rate is low.
Perhaps their most interesting result, however, in view of 
the potential problem identified by Teitlebaum and Robinson 
is the empirical testing of the stratified mean per unit 
estimator. Four broad types of population were constructed 
by Neter and Loebbecke as follows:-
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Population
1
2
3
4
Skewness of
Book
Values
Very High
Moderate
High
Moderate
Error
Direction
Over and under 
Over and under 
Over only 
Over only
Size of
Individual
Errors
Small
Large
Moderate
Large
Within each population type five different populations were 
constructed each with the same characteristics of skewness, 
error direction and error size, hut with different error rates* 
The error rates chosen were 0*5%, 1%, 5%, 10% and 30% (70% for 
population 2) covering the spectrum from low to very high.
Thus, in total 20 populations were constructed. Optimal 
stratified mean per unit sampling procedures for a sample 
size of 100 and 15 strata were applied 600 times to each popu­
lation (optiffial procedures are, of course, for book values 
rather than actual values which are unknown to the auditor). 
The nominal confidence coefficient given by the statistical 
theory can then be compared with the proportion of the 600 
confidence intervals in the sampling experiment which are cor­
rect. If they differ substantially, the implication would be 
that the auditor cannot rely on the nominal confidence coef­
ficient. Neter and Loebbecke*s results for a two sided 95.4% 
nominal confidence coefficient and a one sided 93.3% nominal 
confidence coefficient are reproduced overleaf: (66)
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Actual Percent of Correct Confidence 
Intervals With Mean-Per-TJnit Estimator for 
15 Strata, n = 100
Population Error Percentage
Population .5 1 5. 10 _3Q*
Two-sided, Nominal 95.4%
1 94.2 94.2 94.7 95.0 95.5
2 96.3 96.2 96.7 96.0 94.7
3 95.5 95.5 95.8 95.7 95.8
4 94.7 94.7 93.3 91.0 95.0
One-sided Lower, Nominal 93*3%
1 94.7 94.8 94.7 96.0 95.0
2 93.5 93.7 94.2 93.8 95.0
3 93.5 93.0 93.2 93.8 93.8
4 89.5 89.5 87.5 85.7 90.5
*Por population 2, this error percentage is 70
These results show that for populations 1, 2 and 5 the propor­
tions of correct intervals are close to the nominal confidence 
for both one sided and two sided intervals. Only for population 
4 do the two figures diverge to any significant extent.
Neter and Loebbecke repeated their experiment for a different 
set of one sided and two sided nominal confidence levels and the 
nature of the results was unchanged. The nature of the results 
was also unchanged by extending to 20 strata but an increase in 
sample size to 200 had the effect of improving the result for 
population 4*
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Although Neter and Loebbecke*s study gives stratified mean per 
unit sampling a relatively clean bill of health they did not 
specifically test the technique for populations with errors 
loaded in one stratum (the case where Teitlebaum and Robinson 
suggest the technique may be vulnerable)• The strength of 
Teitlebaum and Robinson's point must depend on the character­
istics of accounting populations and error patterns.
IJIRI AND KAPLAN
Ijiri and Kaplan have developed a sampling plan in which it is 
assumed the auditor has four sampling objectives. The objec­
tives are to obtain a sample which;
1. represents the population (representative sampling)
2. maximises the number of errors found in the sample 
(corrective sampling)
3. maximises the monetary value of items included in the 
sample (protective sampling)
4. prevents anticipation by the auditee of the auditor's 
choice of sample items (preventive sampling)
Ijiri and Kaplan criticise sampling plans (such as estimation 
and acceptance sampling) which concentrate solely on the rep­
resentative objective. Their model incorporating all four 
objectives depends on three types of prior knowledge being 
available to the auditor:
1. The auditor must know the recorded monetary value of
each item in the population. The contribution a selected 
sample item makes to the 'protection' objective depends 
upon its monetary value.
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2. The auditor must have knowledge enabling him to stratify 
the population according to the likelihood of error.
The contribution a selected sample item makes to the 
'correction* objective depends upon its likelihood of 
being in error.
3. The auditor must know the particular control area in the 
organisation that generated each item in the population. 
Meeting the 'prevention* objective depends upon sample 
items coming from a sufficient variety of control areas.
Outline of the Model
The model uses the following measures;
1. Representative Samplings the width w of a confidence 
interval at a given level of significance.
2. Corrective Sampling; the estimated number r of unchecked 
items in error, i.e. the product of the number of items 
not in the sample and the proportion of errors in the 
sample.
3. Protective Sampling: the ratio u of the total dollar value 
of items not in the sample to the (estimated) total dollar 
value of the population.
4* Preventive Sampling: the ratio v of the number of areas in 
which a specified minimum number of items (say, 1 or 2) 
have not been selected in the sample to the total number 
of areas.
The model, which relies on nonlinear and goal programming, gives
the smallest sample necessary to meet specified values of
w, r, u and v.
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In outline, the approach is as follows:
1* A sample is designed as if representative sampling were
the only objective,
2, Before checking the items in (l) above the sample is
examined to see if it meets the corrective objective.
If not, additional (high error risk) items are included 
in the sample,
5- Before checking the items in (l) and (2) above the
sample is examined to see if it meets the preventive 
objective. If not, additional items are chosen from 
unsampled control areas,
4. Finally, the items in (l), (2) and (5) above are examined
from the protective point of view. If their monetary 
value is insufficient additional (high value) items are 
chosen,
KINNEY
Kinney is critical of Ijiri and Kaplan's assumptions and, 
whilst not quarrelling with the representative and preventive 
objectives, he claims it is illogical for an auditor to seek 
correction and protection after his representative objective 
has been met.
Suppose that for a particular type of audit situation 
we can determine the minimum level of confidence and 
precision required under generally accepted auditing 
standards. If an auditor's sample has met the repre­
sentative sampling objective and it can be shown that 
he selects additional higher dollar value and/or higher 
error rate items, we can ask why he is unwilling to 
rely on the mathematical statement which he can make •••• 
to the extent that auditors have met generally accepted 
auditing standards by representative sampling and still 
extend the sample, the added cost is wasted or at least 
inefficiently used. (6?)
- <117
In reply to Kinney, Ijiri and Kaplan stress they do not claim 
the corrective and protective objectives to be necessary in 
any statistical sense; these two objectives are the auditor's 
'non-statistioal' objectives and the fact that they exist can 
be seen by observing auditor's behaviour. Given that these 
objectives exist Ijiri and Kaplan show how they can be in­
cluded in a mathematical model.
We hoped to make explicit the non-statistioal objectives 
that we felt auditors had in mind while conducting an 
audit. We attempted to show how these non-statistical 
objectives could be modelled mathematically, and how a 
normative model could be developed to achieve all of the 
auditor's objectives in an efficient way. The policy 
issue of whether the auditor should pursue these ob­
jectives must be debated and it may be more fundamental 
than the empirical question of whether auditors actually 
have these objectives in mind when they sample. We do 
not believe that what is expected of auditors' 'due 
professional care* in sampling should be identical to 
that expected of statisticians, insofar as the purpose 
of auditing is broader than the objectives of statistical 
sampling. (68)
In the absence of research in the area (a simple and rather 
inconclusive test was performed by Hubbard and Stawser (69)), 
Ijiri and Kaplan are forced to rely on their experience of 
auditors' behaviour to support their corrective and protective 
assumptions,
This writer's experience is that auditors do pursue these 
objectives; for example, they are concerned with cut-off tests 
(high error risk) and with the proportion of a population total 
formed by the value of items tested. It is intuitively sensible 
to seek the high error risk and high value items when deploying 
scarce audit resources.
However, Kinney does not deny that auditors do and should seek 
correction and protection. The question is, how much correction 
and how much protection should auditors seek, and the answer is.
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just as much as necessary to meet the representative objective. 
Thus, Kinney sees correction and protection as sub-objectives 
of the representative objective. Correction and protection 
are consistent with and result from the representative ob­
jective. Kinney demonstrates as follows:
1. Stratify population in two dimensions; by reported 
dollar value and likely error rate.
2. The resulting cells are assumed to be independent and 
the dollar amount of the error of an item in a cell is 
assumed to be proportional to the reported dollar value.
5. The expected error is zero for each cell.
4. Given (l) to (3) the standard deviation (sij) of the 
error distribution of a cell is given by -
sij = /pi (fUj)£7 ®
where
pi = probability of an item in the *i*th error class
being in error
f = constant of proportionality
Dj = average reported dollar value of items in the
*j*th dollar value class
5. Using stratified sampling and the Neyman Allocation it 
can be shown that the number of sample items in each cell 
(nij) is given by -
nij sij
“ 4. 1 Nij elj 
i j
where
Nij = the number of items in cell (i j)
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6. Thus, the auditor will sample more from a cell if the 
standard deviation of the error distribution is higher 
than for other cells.
7. A higher standard deviation (sij) results from a higher 
probability of error (pi) or larger dollar values (Dj)
(see 4).
The argument is, therefore, that the auditor should not 
explicitly seek a specified level of correction or protection, 
but does explicitly seek a given width of a confidence inter­
val with a stated level of significance. However, in order to 
meet the latter objective, an efficient sampling plan will, 
given prior knowledge of money values and likelihood of errors, 
sample from high error risk and high value items thus giving 
an appearance of ‘correction* and 'protection*.
LIMITATIONS OF VARIABLES SMPLIHG 
Direct Extension
The work of Kaplan, and Neter and Loebbecke confirms that 
direct extension can give misleading results when populations 
are skewed and is inefficient when populations are variable.
The implication is that an auditor needs prior knowledge of 
the following population characteristics;
(1) skewness
(2) variability
The requirement for prior knowledge of these population 
characteristics detracts from the only advantage that direct 
extension appears to have over rival sampling plans viz. it 
does not require knowledge of the reported values of items 
making up the population. It is unlikely that the auditor
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will be in a position to ascertain skewness and variability 
but not in a position to ascertain reported values of popu­
lation items. The prior knowledge required by direct extension 
is of population characteristics rather than the accounting 
system. However, the number of occasions on which this tech­
nique proves useful to the auditor is so small that the fact 
that it does not require prior knowledge of the system is of 
relatively little significance.
Differences sampling and ratio estimation
The work of Kaplan, and Neter and Loebbecke confirms that the 
difference and ratio estimators can give misleading results 
when the error rate in the population is low. Injection of 
artificial errors into the population is not a solution to 
this problem and for difference or ratio estimators to be used, 
there should be 'qualifying errors* in the population. This 
prior knowledge of the error rate in the accounting population 
is probably most conveniently obtained through an examination 
of the accounting system.
Stratified sampling
Neter and Loebbecke give stratified sampling a relatively clean 
bill of health but Teitlebaum and Robinson (T & r ) demonstrate 
that the technique may give misleading results when the error 
is loaded into a single stratum. The point of T & R*s article 
is that stratified sampling (their point also applies to 
other variables sampling techniques; notably ratio estimation) 
cannot be relied upon to give accurate results no matter 
what the distribution of error and no matter what
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the size of error. If the auditor wishes to empLoysuch 
techniques he should;
(1) be aware of the error distributions and error sizes for 
which the technique gives inaccurate results,
and
(2) have prior knowledge of the likely distribution of error 
and size of error in the accounting population under 
examination.
There is a need for much further research into the circum­
stances in which various sampling plans give misleading results. 
Once these circumstances are generally known, the auditor must 
learn to identify their existence in the particular accounting 
populations in which he is interested. Whenever the circum­
stances include error rates, error sizes or error distri­
butions the auditor is likely to find an examination of the 
accounting system a necessity,
Comuuterisation
A number of factors indicated by Elliott and Rogers point to 
the importance of computerised accounting records and computer­
ised sampling procedures (both selection and calculation) where 
stratified sampling is used;
1. problems associated with sample selection.
The most versatile variables sampling technique is stratified 
sampling and the procedures for optimal selection of strata 
boundaries and allocation of the sample between strata are 
sufficiently complex that they can only easily be performed 
by computer*
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2. problems associated with the evaluation of sample 
results•
The formulae for computation of the estimator and standard 
error of the estimator are also complex and the calculations 
are preferably performed by computer,
5, problems associated with a revision of sample sizes 
caused by expectations not being realised.
Sample size in each stratum depends upon the standard 
deviation of sample items drawn from the stratum. Since 
sample items and their true values cannot be known in advance 
the auditor must calculate stratum sample sizes on the basis 
of estimated standard deviations and whenever these estimates 
are unrealised he must revise sample sizes. The possibility 
of having to perform revised calculations reinforces the need 
for computerisation.
The dependence of stratified sampling on computerisation in 
all but the simplest applications, limits the extent to which 
the technique is used in practice and, therefore, also limits 
the significance of the comments made on the need for prior 
information in connection with the use of this technique, 
Error prone areas
Stratified sampling stratifies the population according to 
the recorded monetary values of population items, but does 
not stratify according to the likelihood of error of popu­
lation items. This is one of the criticisms of conventional 
sampling plans made by Ijiri and Kaplan. However, Kinney
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demonstrates that a variables sampling plan can stratify the 
population in two dimensions (by both reported value and 
likely error rate) and the application of such a plan clearly 
requires prior knowledge of likely error rates. Again this 
prior knowledge may best be gained through an examination of 
the accounting system,
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Table 10 summarises the comments made in this chapter upon 
the major variables sampling plans considered for use in 
auditing.
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TABLE 10 Comments on variables sampling plans
Direct extension
1, Variable population results in inefficiency*
2. Skewed population causes misleading results*
5* Prior information needs:
(a) population variability
(b) population skewness
4* Because of 1 above this technique little used in 
practice.
Differences
1, Requires qualifying number of errors or results are 
misleading.
2. Requires errors to be of non-trivial amount or results 
are misleading.
5. Efficiency improved if differences are all of similar
size since standard error of estimate is low.
4. Prior information needs;
(a) number of errors
(b) size of errors
5. Useful technique for giving the size of an 'adjustment* 
to the accounts.
Stratified
1. There is a possibility, based on the Teitlebaum and
Robinson paper that stratified sampling is misleading 
if errors follow a certain distribution pattern. This 
possibility requires further research.
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2. Computerisation is 'almost* an essential.
5. Prior information needs;
(a) distribution of errors
(b) computerisation
4* May be adapted to stratify by error risk as well as 
size of items.
5* Additional prior information need for 4:
(c) likelihood of error for individual items.
6. The most versatile of the variables techniques when a 
computer facility is available.
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This chapter has completed the study of the two propositions 
which were first investigated in the previous chapter;
1. There is no single choice of statistical sampling
technique which is annronriate in all circumstances.
The chapter has shown that differences sampling gives mis­
leading results when population error rates are low. More­
over, for differences sampling to he applicable the errors 
must be non-trivial in amount. Stratified sampling plans are 
very time consuming when performed manually and Teitlebaum 
and Robinson have indicated that stratified variables sampling 
plans may be defective for certain error distributions in the 
populations. Generally speaking mean per unit sampling is an 
inefficient technique.
2• The chances of making the proper selection of
statistical sampling technique improve as a result 
of examination of the accounting system and its 
internal controls.
Two further reasons why the selection of a sampling plan is 
assisted by prior examination of the system are recognised in 
this chapter:
1) to avoid using differences sampling when the error rate 
is low,
2) to improve the efficiency of stratified variables sampling 
by stratifying according to error risk as well as value.
As with monetary unit sampling it is likely to be the case that 
efficient and reliable use of a variables sampling plan
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requires prior knowledge of the error rate, distribution 
and size and any such requirement in turn is likely to 
cause the auditor to make careful examination of the 
accounting system.
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CHAPTER 5
THE THEORY OF AUDIT EVIDENCE AND THE NEED FOR SYSTEMS 
EXAMINATION
This chapter concentrates on the second major problem of the 
substantive approach to the audit, viz, not how many sample 
items to include but what evidence to choose to substantiate 
the sample items chosen? The chapter is divided into the 
following sections :
1. Identifying the probabilities
The analysis identifies the probabilities which the auditor 
implicitly assesses when he evaluates the quality of evidence. 
It starts with the simplest case of a single piece of evidence 
used to support a single transaction and develops to consider 
the single transaction - multiple evidence and multiple 
transaction - multiple evidence cases.
2. The need to study the system
It is argued that, of the probabilities identified in the 
analysis, those concerning pieces of evidence processed or 
generated by the system can only be assessed by the auditor 
if he has first examined that accounting system. Broadly, the 
distinction between evidence dependent upon the system and 
evidence independent of the system corresponds to the dis­
tinction between authoritative documents prepared 'inside* 
and 'outside* the enterprise under examination (70).
Examples of audit evidence employed in substantive tests of 
details are
a) independent of the system - debtors* circulars, creditors* 
statements etc.
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b) dependent upon the system - despatch notes, goods 
received notes, copy sales invoices etc,
5. The concept of * independent*evidence
The nature of independence in the context of the theory of 
audit evidence is examined in terms of the probabilities 
identified in 1 , on the previous page. It is demonstrated 
that the greater the independence of the marginal piece of 
evidence from established evidence, the greater the marginal 
increase in confidence of the auditor when the marginal 
piece of evidence is established.
IDENTIFYING THE PROBABILITIES
Single Evidence - Single Transaction
The following analysis of the theory of audit evidence is 
based on Bayes Theorem and was first suggested by Toba (71).
It starts with the case of a single piece of evidence to 
support a single transaction and develops to consider multiple 
pieces of evidence and multiple transactions.
Consider the equation —
P(a/b) = ^ ^ ( ^ / ^ )  (Bayes Theorem)
Suppose B is a single piece of evidence in support of A and 
assume that A implies B and hence P(b/a ) a 1,
Bayes * theorem reduces to -
P(A/B) = 0 }
. . p(a) = P(a/B) X p(b) (equation 1)
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Two aspects of the theory of evidence follow from equation(l);
(1) The existence of B, the audit evidence, is not certain 
and, hence the prior probability of B(p (b )) is less 
than 1. Since P(b) <  1 it follows from equation (l) 
that, P(a/B) ^  P(A).
The probability (p (a/b )) of A after establishing B is 
greater than the prior probability of A(p (a )), Toba 
defines B as supporting evidence since establishing B 
makes A more tenable. The following statement is 
established;
As a result of establishing supporting evidence B. 
the auditor's confidence in A increases.
(2) Assuming that P(a) remains the same before and after B 
is established, equation (l) is of the form xy = c^ 
and describes a rectangular hyperbola. Figure 5 
illustrates the rectangular hyperbola graphically.
P(A/B)
P(B)
FiaURE 5
It can be seen that P(a/b) is greater, the smaller P(b).
The auditor's confidence in A after establishing B, varies 
inversely with the prior probability of B. The following 
statement is established:
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The increase in the auditor's confidence in A varies 
inversely with the prior probability of B.
Odds - likelihood form
Toba's analysis of audit evidence is in terms of the simple 
form of Bayes* theorem. As an alternative, the odds likeli­
hood ratio form can be used. There are only two alternative 
hypotheses; either A exists or not A (a) exists and the odds - 
likelihood form of Bayes Theorem gives
PCA/B) = P
pCtTb
Again, suppose B is a single source of evidence in support of 
A and assume that A implies B and, hence, P(b/a ) = 1.
The odds - likelihood form of Bayes' theorem reduces to
The relationship between the posterior odds and the prior odds 
depends on P(b/X) . What is the probability of the evidence B 
existing, given that A does not exist? If this probability
p(B/r)
‘ ”  p (b/j )
high and the revision of the odds is much greater. The 
following statement is established:
The increase in the auditor's confidence in A as a result 
of establishing B varies inversely with the probability of 
B given A does not exist (p Cb/ D ) .
It is easier to focus on P(b/2T) than P(b), and, hence, this is 
a more useful form of Bayes* theorem. For example, if debtors'
(p (b/X)) is high, then is low and there is not much
revision of the odds. If P(b/J), however, is low, T-yl'y-y is
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circulars are used as evidence of debtors' balances, the 
auditor can, from his experience, form a subjective view of 
the probability of a confirmation given that the debtor's 
balance is incorrect. This is more meaningful than simply 
the prior probability of receiving a confirmation.
If a confirmation is unlikely, given that a debtor's balance 
does not exist, then a debtor's circularisation provides a 
valuable source of audit evidence. In a Bayesian analysis the 
quality of the evidence B can be identified with the con­
ditional probability P(b/X).
Single Transaction - Multiple Evidence
Toba uses equation (l) to evaluate a single available piece of 
evidence, and then adapts equation (l) to enable the evaluation 
of a piece of evidence which is one of several available. 
Suppose, instead of a single piece of evidence (b), many pieces 
of evidence (b^, b2, b^, etc) are available. The auditor has 
established b^, bg .... bm and is about to establish b^ ^ 2* 
Equation (l) then becomes;
P(A/b2 bg .... bm) = P(A/b]^  bg .... bm+l) x
P(bm+l/b^ bg .... bm)
(equation 2)
Equation (2) can be demonstrated as follows:
Applying equation (l) to the first piece of audit 
evidence (b^).
P(A) = P(A/bi) X P(bi)
P(A/bi)
P(bl
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to the second piece of audit evidence (bg)
P(A/bi bg ) =
P(t2/bi)
to the m + 1 piece of audit evidence bm+l,
P(A/b]^  bg bm+l) = bg bm)
P(bm+l/b]^ bg .... bm)
.*. P(A/b% bg .... bm) = P(A/b^ bg .... bm+l) x
P(bm+l/b]^ bg .... bm)
Toba makes the following points:
1. P(bm+l/b-j^ bg .... bm) is less than 1 and, therefore 
P(A/b^bg .... bm+l) is greater than P^A/b^bg bm). 
Hence, the marginal piece of evidence (bm+l) increases 
the auditor's confidence in A, and it follows that when 
several pieces of evidence support a proposition confi­
dence in the proposition is increased.
2. If bm+l is unexpected and P(bm+l/b^bg .... bm) is low, 
the additional confidence resulting from the marginal 
source of evidence bm+l is high. As more sources of 
evidence are established, it is likely that the marginal 
piece of evidence becomes more expected, and the additional 
confidence resulting from the marginal piece of evidence 
declines. This is the principle of diminishing marginal 
weight of evidence.
Multiple Transaction - Multiple Evidence
The evaluation of a sample result takes place in two stages:
1. evaluation of evidence in support of individual 
transactions selected in the sample;
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2* evaluation of the sample results# This converts evidence 
of individual transactions into evidence of an entire 
account balance.
Toba demonstrates that the second stage is described by- 
equation (2). Suppose an account balance A implies trans­
actions t^ tg t^ ... tjjj t;g_^2 etc. Hence, P(t]^/A), P(tg/A) 
etc. = 1. However, establishing a single transaction t^^
is not conclusive evidence (Toba says it does not confirm A) 
of A. Even establishing a large sample of transactions leaves 
a possibility that A is untrue. However, the following state­
ments can be made:
1. Establishing the marginal transaction, (^m+l) increases 
confidence in A.
2. As more transactions are established, the marginal 
transaction becomes more expected and the additional 
confidence provided declines.
These statements are consistent with attribute sampling. The 
graph in figure 6 shows the shape of the curve for the maxi­
mum potential error rate given different sample sizes assuming 
zero errors and a 95% confidence level.
FIGURE 6
Sample size
135 -
As sample size increases the slope of the curve becomes a 
lower negative figure indicating that M.P.E.R, falls at a 
declining rate.
The analysis can be extended to the evaluation of evidence in 
support of individual transactions (first stage - this appli­
cation is not considered by Toba). Suppose the existence of
a transaction t implies evidence e-, e^ ••• e e _ etc. Hence,1 2 m  m+1
P (e^/t), P^Cg/t) etc. = 1. However, establishing a single
piece of evidence e^ is not conclusive evidence of t. Even 
when several pieces of evidence are established some doubt 
will remain. However, the following statements can be made:
1, Establishing the marginal place of evidence in­
creases confidence in t.
2. As more evidence is established, the marginal evidence 
becomes more expected and the additional confidence 
provided, declines.
Reducing the burden of evidence
The auditor is required, not to consult all pieces of evidence 
in support of each transaction, but to consult sufficient 
evidence to satisfy himself of the true value. A sufficient 
number of pieces of evidence is likely to decrease as the 
number of transactions already tested, increases. Suppose 
there are m sources of evidence (e^Og ••• ... e^) available
to support each sample item (t^tg ... t^  ^ ... t^) chosen from 
a population.
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©2 ~ — @22 — — — ©m
t2
t
■th
The increase in the auditor’s confidence in t|^  which results 
from establishing e^ is then a function of P(©n/ei©2 * » ®n-l^•
The smaller this probability, the greater the increase in the 
auditor’s confidence when the evidence is established.
Let us assume the order in which the auditor establishes 
®1®2®3 etc. is such that the increase in confidence resulting 
from is greater than that from ©2 etc. In this case 
f (e^ ) <  P(eg /©i) C.P(e^ /e]^ e2) ' " '*^ (^®n/®l®2 ••• ®n-l)
.... <P(eg2/ei©2 ... - INEQUALITY 3.
In general, a piece of evidence ©^ ceases to contribute to 
the auditor* s confidence as P(ej^/e^e2 ... ®h-l) tends to 1.
From inequality (3),
1“P(Q]_) 1—P^Gg/0%) ^  .... 1—p(©22/ ... ©n—2 )
>  1-P(eyej^e2 ... - INEQUALITY 4.
As the number of sample items for which e2©2 ... ©^ are 
established, increases, so the auditor revises his assessment
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of P(®ïi/®i®2 *•* ®n-l) However, it can be seen
from inequality (4) that the amount of revision needed for 
P(e^) before ceases to contribute to the auditor’s con­
fidence is greater than that needed for P(e2/e^) before ©2 
ceases to contribute, which is greater than that needed for 
P(e^ /e-j^ e2) before ceases to contribute etc. Hence, the 
number of sample items for which ©]_ needs to be established 
is larger than the number of sample items for which 
(given e^) needs to be established, which is larger than the 
number of sample items for which e^ (given need be
established, etc.
Figure 7 illustrates the type of approach suggested by this
analysis, (in reality the relative cost of establishing each 
piece of evidence is also an influence on the order in which 
pieces of evidence are given up by the auditor).
©1 ©2 ®3 ®4 ©5
tl — ■^ 10 X X X X X
■*^11 " X X X X
tig; - ^20 X X X
^21 - *50 X X
■*^51 - tlOO X
FIGURE 7
There are five available sources of evidence and a sample of 
100 items has been chosen. All 5 sources are established for
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the first 10 items, and none of the evidence contradicts 
each other. As a result of this the auditor is able to 
revise his conditional probabilities P(©2/®l)»
P(G^/e2©2)’ P(®4/®x®2®5^ and P(e^/©262®3^4) "apwards. He 
is now of the opinion that P(e^/e2e2©^©4) i© tending to 1 
and, hence, no longer makes a contribution. For the next 
5 items he considers only 4 sources of evidence. He is then 
in a position to once again revise his probabilities upwards 
and to drop out the fourth source of evidence etc.
Variations in the approach do not facilitate this argument. 
For example, figure 8 reverses the approach illustrated in 
figure
®1 ©2
_
tl - t^Q X
■*^51 - ^80 X X
tax - t05 X X X
■^ 86 - X X X X
^91 - tlOO X X X X X
FIGURE 8
Neither this reversal, nor any other variation is desirable 
since it is the experience in the earlier items tested which 
enables the auditor to revise his probabilities upwards and
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drop out first e^, then etc. In the approach shown in 
figure 8 there is no experience of ©2®3®4 ®5 gained in
the first 50 transactions.
THE NEED TO STUDY THE SYSTEM
Many of the pieces of evidence employed by the auditor, 
especially when substantively testing profit or loss items, 
are either generated or processed by the system. Suppose, 
for example, that the transactions under investigation are 
sales, and that the multiple evidence in support of each 
sales transaction is:
(a) despatch
(b) returned delivery advice
(c) copy sales invoice
(d) stock records entry
(e) cash receipt from customer
In a typical system, the despatch note is generated by goods 
outwards and used to generate the delivery advice (which 
travels with the goods) and the sales and copy sales invoices 
(excluding price and arithmetic). The delivery advice may be 
returned from the customer with the customer’s signature to 
evidence receipt of goods. The sales and copy sales Invoice 
are processed in the accounts departments (eg price and arith­
metic are included) and the despatch note is used to generate 
an entry reducing stock in stock records. Clearly each of the 
first four pieces of evidence are both generated and processed 
by the accounting system.
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The auditor must decide which pieces of evidence to use and 
in what order. Assuming the auditor wishes to use all five 
pieces of evidence to at least a limited extent, then the 
ordering may be made in any one of 120 (5*) ways and to choose 
between these 120 alternatives the auditor must consider an 
even higher number of conditional probabilities. Clearly an 
examination of all possibilities is not possible and the 
auditor is likely to select an order, which although unlikely 
to be optimal, appears to be reasonably efficient. Suppose
he selects the order as follows: despatch----- ^  returned
delivery advice  ----- ^  copy sales invoice  ----- ^  stock
records entry------ ^  cash receipt from customer. In such a
case the auditor must consider such probabilities as P(b/a)
(i.e. the probability of a proper returned delivery advice 
given a despatch note), P(c/ab) (the probability of a proper 
copy sales invoice given both a despatch and delivery advice) 
etc. Only when he assesses such probabilities can the auditor 
assess the additional confidence which results from establish­
ing each marginal piece of evidence. The assessment of these 
probabilities requires an examination of the accounting system.
THE CONCEPT OF ’INDEPENDENT’ EVIDENCE
In general, the theory of evidence states that when independently 
derived pieces of evidence support a proposition, confidence in 
the proposition is increased. What is meant by the concept of 
’independent’ evidence in this context?
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Toba’s analysis suggests that when p(bm+l/bxbg ... bm) is 
low, bm+l makes a significant contribution to the auditor’s 
conficlence in proposition A. Hence, given that b^bg ... bm 
have been established, p(bm+l/b^bg ... bm) is a measure of 
the quality of bm+l as a piece of evidence. However, if there 
is no prior evidence, p(bm+l) is a measure of the quality of 
bm+l. The first of these measures the quality of bm+l as a 
marginal piece of evidence in the specific circumstances and 
the second, the quality of bm+l as a sole piece of evidence.
The difference between these two measures (i.e. between 
p(bm+l/bg^bg ... bm) and p(bm+l)) can be taken as a measure 
of the independence of bm+l from established evidence. If 
this difference is zero, then -
p(bm+l/b^bg .... bm) = p(bm+l)
and bm+l is completely independent of established evidence in 
a strict statistical sense.
However, this strict statistical independence is an unusual 
occurrence in an audit context. For example, there may be at 
least five pieces, of evidence in support of a receipt of stock
1. purchase invoice
2. goods received note
3. payment to supplier
4* reconciliation with supplier’s statement
5. entry in stock records
To varying degrees, none of this evidence is independent. The 
entry in the stock records might be made, not from an indepen­
dent count by the storekeeper, but directly from the goods
— 142 —
received note. Payment to a supplier will normally depend 
upon both an invoice and a goods received note being received 
in the accounts section concerned. Reconciliation with a 
supplier’s statement depends upon invoices and payments-
In an audit evidence context, there will be a difference 
between p(bm+l/b^bg ... bm) and p (bm+l) and the smaller this 
difference, the greater the independence of bm+l from estab­
lished evidence.
Algebraicly, the position is as follows:
Let Qs = the quality of evidence bm+l as a sole 
piece of evidence
Qm = the quality of evidence bm+l as a marginal
piece of evidence
then Qs = 1 - p(bm+l)
Qm = 1 - p(bm+l/b^bg ... bm)
and Qs - Qm = p(bm+l/b^bg ... bm) - p(bm+l)
The quality of bm+l as a marginal piece of evidence depends 
upon:
1. its quality as a sole piece of evidence (Qs)
2. its independence from established evidence (Qs - Qm)
Provided it has the ability to contribute as a sole piece of 
evidence, independent evidence has the ability to contribute 
as a marginal piece of evidence.
The concept of independent evidence is capable of giving 
important insights into the use of different pieces of audit
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evidence. It has, for example, been used by this author to 
develop a theoretical distinction between compliance tests 
and substantive tests other than compliance tests (72) • Evi­
dence of internal control design reliability and compliance 
may be used as evidence of substantive conditions (this is the 
basis of the systems approach). The theory of evidence states 
that when independent pieces of evidence support a proposition, 
confidence in the proposition increases. When it is proposed 
to employ further evidence, other than systems evidence, in 
support of a proposition as to substantive conditions then 
such evidence should be independent of the systems evidence 
(including compliance evidence). Independent evidence of in­
ternal control design reliability can be provided by analysis 
of internal controls and their cumulative effect. What is not 
always done by the auditor is to select compliance and substan­
tive tests which are consistent with the requirement that evi­
dence of compliance and further evidence of substantive con­
ditions should be independent. The following tests have been 
suggested to examine the independence of substantive and 
compliance evidence:
A substantive test is any test capable of providing 
additional knowledge of underlying substantive conditions, 
even though the auditor were to have complete prior 
knowledge of compliance conditions.
A compliance test is any test capable of providing 
additional knowledge of underlying compliance conditions, 
even though the auditor were to have complete prior 
knowledge of substantive conditions.
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The idea is» for example, that if further substantive 
evidence is independent of compliance evidence, it should 
be capable of providing additional knowledge of substantive 
conditions even though, hypothetically, the auditor were 
already to have perfect evidence (i*e. complete knowledge) 
of compliance conditions* The author has illustrated the 
use of these tests of independence by reference to two simple 
audit procedures (73).
COMGLTTSIOH
Any substantive tests of details take place in two stages;
1. Evaluation of evidence in support of individual 
transactions selected in the sample.
2. Evaluation of sample results.
One of the advantages of substantive testing as a source of 
evidence is that the sample results may be objectively calcu­
lated using statistical techniques. However, there are prob­
lems associated with the selection and operation of sampling 
plans and these were discussed in earlier chapters. This 
chapter has considered the problems associated with evaluation 
of evidence in support of individual transactions selected in 
the sample. The theory of evidence has been examined in terms 
of Bayes* theorem to give an understanding of the probabilities 
implicitly assessed by the auditor when he evaluates evidence. 
It is shown that where the evidence of transactions (or account 
balances) is processed or generated by the system (i.e. it is 
not independent of the system) an examination of the system is 
necessary for the proper evaluation of the evidence. Hence,
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this chapter establishes the important role of the systems 
examination in the assessment and selection of substantive 
evidence for sample items.
This chapter has also highlighted the importance of the concept 
of * independence’ in the context of audit evidence combination. 
Provided it has the ability to contribute as a sole piece of 
evidence, independent evidence has the ability to contribute 
as a marginal piece of evidence. Assuming that compliance 
tests are independent of substantive tests, then the systems 
examination provides a source of audit evidence independent 
of the substantive testing. This quality of independence from 
the substantive testing is likely to make the systems exam­
ination a valuable component in the audit approach whenever 
the internal control design is assessed as reliable.
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CHAPTER 6 
CQNCLÏÏSION
This thesis has studied the relationship between systems and 
substantive evidence from two different perpectives. Chapter 2 
investigated the relationship from the perspective of the 
systems approach. This chapter reviewed conventional ideas 
on the nature of systems evidence and on the problems of com­
bining the rather more subjective systems evidence with the 
rather less subjective substantive testing. It was found that 
there is at present no satisfactory formal method of combining 
the evidence, although various procedures are employed in prac­
tice for linking the confidence level required from substantive 
tests with the results of the systems assessment. Chapters 3,
4 and 5 investigated the relationship between systems and sub­
stantive evidence from the perspective of the substantive 
approach. The two key decisions for those adopting the sub­
stantive approach are;
1. which sampling technique to adopt?
2, what substantive evidence to employ in support of sample 
items?
It was found that an understanding of the system is necessary 
for an efficient solution to both these problems. Whereas the 
systems approach concentrates on the role of systems examin­
ation as a source of audit evidence which supports the finan­
cial statements, the substantive approach, therefore, focuses 
attention on two further important roles for the systems 
examination,
1. as a source of information for making the choice of 
statistical sampling technique.
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Given the possibly serious consequences of selecting an 
inappropriate technique, this role of the systems examination 
deserves understanding and consideration by the auditor. 
Selection of an appropriate required confidence level based 
on the systems examination can be no more important than 
selection of an appropriate statistical technique, since if 
the statistical technique is inappropriate the nominal confi­
dence provided by the technique may differ significantly from 
the real confidence level achieved. There is little point in 
knowing what real confidence the auditor should be looking for 
from his statistical test if the statistical technique is not 
capable of measuring the real confidence level*
2• as a source of information for making the selection of 
substantive evidence to support individual transactions 
or balances.
The importance of this relationship between the study of the 
system and an understanding of the quality of the substantive 
evidence deserves prominence. Selection of'an appropriate 
confidence level is no more important than selection of appro­
priate audit evidence to substantiate sample items in the sub­
stantive test, since there is little point in getting the 
right number of items in the substantive sample if the evidence 
substantiating individual sample items is not properly 
understood.
The thesis, therefore, has identified and studied the following 
three theoretical roles for the systems examination:
1. systems examination as a source of audit evidence.
(chapter 2)
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2, systems examination as a source of information for 
making the choice of statistical sampling technique. 
(Chapters 3 and 4)
3. systems examination as a source of information for 
making the selection of substantive evidence to support 
individual transactions or balances.
(Chapter 5)
Although the first role has been given much coverage in the 
auditing literature, the second and third roles have been 
given far less attention.
IMPLICATIONS EOR AUDIT POLICY
The question arises as to what are the implications for audit 
policy of a recognition of the three, rather than the one, 
important roles for the systems examination. One contribution 
of such a recognition is to clarify the distinction between 
the 'systems* and ’substantive* approaches to the audit. Con­
ventionally the systems approach is regarded as one which places 
reliance on the system and its internal controls and the sub­
stantive approach as one which does not. This is too simple 
and the distinction between the two approaches should be viewed 
in terms of how the auditor uses the systems examination rather 
than in terms of whether or not he uses the systems examination. 
In the systems approach the systems examination is used pri­
marily as a source of audit evidence supporting the financial 
statements and, therefore, justifying a reduction in substantive
— 14!:^
testing* In the substantive approach the significance of the 
systems examination lies in its assistance with the choice of 
sampling technique and the understanding it provides of the 
quality of substantive evidence processed or generated by the 
system.
It is possible to go further and to suggest that the require­
ment for * independent * evidence as explained in Chapter 5 
requires the ’systems' and 'substantive* approaches to be 
defined in such a way that the evidence in support of the 
financial statements provided by the systems examination and 
substantive testing is independent.
\idien the auditor adopts what is, at present, commonly under­
stood to be the systems approach, the systems examination is 
used first to justify a reduction in the volume of substantive 
testing but then, quite possibly, again to justify the quality 
of pieces of evidence processed or generated by the systems 
and employed to substantiate sample items.
In such circumstances the systems and substantive evidence may 
not be independent. If such evidence is to be independent 
then the results of the substantive testing should be capable 
of supporting the financial statements irrespective of the con­
dition of the accounting system and its internal controls. 
Should, however, the accounting system be poor, evidence gen­
erated by that system may not be capable of substantiating 
sample items and it follows that any substantive tests which 
rely on such evidence may not be independent of the systems 
examination. In other words, if the auditor gets his systems
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assessment wrong then the substantive test results are also 
likely to be misleading if they should rely on pieces of 
evidence processed or generated by the system. To the extent 
that the substantive testing relies on such internal evidence, 
the substantive tests and systems examination cannot be re­
garded as independent. The principal area where substantive 
testing uses internal evidence is in the substantive testing 
of transactions. However, internal evidence is also some­
times used to substantiate balance sheet items, For example, 
despatch notes, invoices etc. are: used to substantiate a debt 
from a customer who does not respond to a debtors circular.
Chapter 5 drew attention to the importance of’independence* in 
determining the quality of evidence when it serves as additional 
or ’marginal * evidence. In chapter 5 it is stated that the 
quality of a piece of evidence as marginal evidence depends 
upon;
1, its quality as a sole piece of evidence, and
2, its independence from established evidence.
Independent marginal evidence has the ability to contribute to 
audit assurance provided it has the ability to contribute as a 
sole piece of evidence. Non independent marginal evidence will 
contribute very little to audit assurance even if it has the 
ability to make a large contribution as a sole piece of 
evidence.
The implication of any such requirement for ’independence* is 
that the auditor should pursue one of two policies;
(a ) to use the systems examination as a source of audit
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evidence justifying a reduction in substantive testing; 
such testing to use only evidence externally generated 
outside of the accountingr system. OR
(b ) to use the systems examination to assess the quality of 
internally generated evidence which is used, together 
with external evidence in substantiating sample items in 
substantive tests and to ignore the role of systems exam­
ination as a source of audit evidence reducing the volume 
of substantive testing.
Policy (a ) provides a re-definition of the ’systems* approach 
and Policy (b) a re-definition of the ’substantive* approach. 
Any policy other than (a ) or (b ) is likely to risk the auditor 
taking assurance in the financial statement figures both from 
the accounting system and from internally generated evidence 
which lacks independence from the accounting system. In effect 
policy (a ) or (B) is necessary to avoid the danger of the 
auditor ’double counting’ the assurance to be obtained from 
the system.
Chapter 2 identified the problems of the role of systems exami­
nation as a source of audit evidence justifying a reduction in 
the substantive testing. This difficulty remains for policy 
(a ). It is the problem of satisfactorily combining the systems 
and substantive evidence. The distinction between policies (a ) 
and (b ) may still be thought of in terras of the use to which 
they put the results of the systems examination. Policy (a ) 
attempts to evaluate the systems evidence in terms of its 
effect on the likelihood of error in the total accounting popu­
lation, It is this assessment of the likelihood of error in
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the total accounting population which determines confidence 
level and, hence, sample size for the substantive testing. 
Policy (b ), however, attempts to evaluate the systems evidence 
in terms of its effect on the likelihood of error in the par­
ticular items selected from the population for substantive 
testing. It then relies upon the chosen statistical sampling 
technique to translate the knowledge concerning the individual 
population items into knowledge relating to the population as 
a whole.
FUTTTRE RESEARCH
This analysis suggests that the ’systems* and ’substantive* 
approaches should be more clearly defined in order to provide 
the auditor with a better understanding of his actual policy 
alternatives. Whether or not this tentative analysis is 
correct depends upon the outcome of the following future 
research which needs to be conducted;
1, *A priori 'research to substantiate and develou the 
analyses of this thesis
In particular such research should further examine;
a) the nature of ’independence’ as used in the context 
of audit evidence and, hence,
b) the significance of the distinction between substan­
tive evidence internally generated by the system and 
externally generated evidence,
2, Empirical research to assess the level of understanding 
by practising auditors of the issues addressed in this 
thesis
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A low level of understanding on the part of practising 
auditors of the relationship between the systems and sub­
stantive evidence would support the conclusion that there is 
a need to clarify the ’systems’ and ’substantive’ approaches 
to the audit. The need is recognised for a number of future 
empirical research studies to discover more about how the 
auditor currently uses his examination of the accounting 
system and its internal controls.
Studies would tackle the following issues;
Selection of sampling plans
To what extent do practising auditors;
a) Appreciate the existence of the various sampling plans 
available?
b) Understand the circumstances in which the various 
sampling plans give misleading or inefficient results?
c) Appreciate the relationship between the systems exami­
nation and the identification of the circumstances in 
which various sampling plans give misleading or inefficient 
results?
Selection of Substantive evidence 
To what extent do practising auditors;
d) Distinguish between substantive evidence generated or 
processed internally by the accounting system and 
evidence generated externally?
e) Consider the possible lack of independence of the systems 
examination, when used as evidence to support the finan­
cial statements, from those substantive tests which
1 5 4  -
employ internally generated evidence?
f) Appreciate the relationship between a study of the 
system and an understanding of the quality of sub­
stantive evidence in support of individual transactions 
or balances?
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ADDENDUM TO THE THESIS
The meaning of the term ’substantive test*
All audit work is performed because the auditor considers 
that it contributes, directly or indirectly, towards the 
’substantiation’ of the accounts# The systems examination 
makes a direct contribution when it allows a reduction in 
other audit work designed to substantiate the accounts#
Generally it is the substantive tests of details that are 
reduced, (in what are termed ’substantive tests of details’ 
the auditor takes a sample of items making up an account 
figure and collects evidence to support these sample items).
The systems examination makes an indirect contribution to the 
substantiation of the accounts when it permits, through roles 
1 and 2 as described on pages 20 to 22 of the Introduction, 
greater understanding of the substantive testing of details.
Role 1, through the selection of an appropriate statistical 
sampling technique, can allow greater understanding of sample 
size and sample selection requirements. Role 2 can allow 
greater understanding of the quality of evidence used to support 
sample items.
The ’systems approach* focuses on the ability of the systems 
examination to directly substantiate the accounts. Following 
this approach the systems examination itself may be regarded as 
’substantive*. This allows substantive tests of details to be 
reduced and the study made in chapter 5 suggests that such tests 
should be independent of the systems examination if they are to 
contribute to audit assurance once the systems examination has
— l6l —
been performed. The ’substantive approach* focuses on the 
ability of the systems examination to aid, or provide greater 
understanding of, the substantive testing of details. Following 
this approach the systems examination becomes a prerequisite 
for, and in a sense, therefore, a part of, the detailed 
substantive testing.
In general throughout this thesis the term ’substantive test* 
refers to substantive tests of details. However, as a result 
of the study made in the thesis it becomes clear that two 
rather different meanings of substantive tests of details are 
implied by the two different audit approaches. A systems 
approach implies substantive tests which are ’independent’ 
of the systems examination. For example, reperformance by the 
auditor of the arithmetic of an invoice provides acceptable 
evidence of arithmetical accuracy whether or not the system 
is operating properly. It is, therefore, a test independent 
of the system. A substantive approach, however, implies sub­
stantive tests whose design is, at least in considerable part, 
a function of the results of the systems examination. For 
example, a sales invoice may be acceptable evidence of a 
sales item because the auditor approves of the system which 
produces that invoice.
Statistical sampling
The author has assumed for purposes of this thesis that the 
auditor faced with substantive testing of details will seek 
to use a statistical sampling technique in order to provide
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an indication, and hence greater understanding, of the 
effectiveness of the sample. At present some auditors 
prefer judgement sampling to any statistical technique.
Given the present stage of development and testing of 
statistical techniques in audit sampling such a decision 
may be very reasonable. This thesis does not pursue the 
question of whether, at the present time, statistical or 
judgement sampling should be used. It does seem probable 
to this author, however, that more and more experimental 
testing of statistical techniques against known accounting 
populations will lead in due course to extensive knowledge 
of the performance of those techniques. Experiments of this 
nature have already been conducted and the results are 
referred to in this thesis. As such knowledge is gained, 
and provided there are techniques which perform well, it 
is likely that more auditors will either adopt statistical 
techniques formally or will seek to infozmially 'simulate' 
techniques when conducting judgement sampling. For example, 
if statistical techniques suggest that samples should be 
oriented toward high value and high error risk items, then 
the auditor will seek to do this in his judgement sampling.
In either case there would be an important role for the systems 
examination in helping the auditor to identify probable high 
error risk items. The role of the systems examination as an 
aid to substantive testing of details is, therefore, likely 
to be important whether statistical or judgemental sampling is
r - — ....
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